



The Roman Imperial Motives during the Middle Republican Era (264-147 BC)

Sophia Patience Graham*
A.I.T. Accra Ghana

***Corresponding Author**
Sophia Patience Graham

Article History

Received: 09.10.2021
Accepted: 16.11.2021
Published: 17.12.2021

Abstract: Motives of Roman imperialism that took place during the middle republican era have generated debate among scholars who criticize and counter-criticize one another. The debate has often been spearheaded by two schools of thought—defensive and the offensive schools of thought. Whereas the defensive school of thought views motives of Roman imperialism as purely self-protective mechanisms, others like Harris (2005) view Roman imperialism as being offensive and think Roman Wars brought tangible economic benefits that influenced decision to go to war. The paper sought to explore the motives for Roman imperialism during the mid-republican era only which took place between 264-147 BC with emphasis on the Pyrrhic Wars.

Keywords: Corvus, Magna Graecia, fides.

Copyright © 2021 The Author(s): This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial use provided the original author and source are credited.

INTRODUCTION

This paper examined the various Punic Wars that took place in 264 B.C., 218 B.C. and 149 B.C. By the mid third century B.C., the Roman republic had secured her position on the Italian Peninsula except the Cisalpine Gaul, after the war with the Etruscans, the Latins, the Samnites and Pyrrhus have been defeated. Victory, though bravely contested by all foes, bred confidence in the Romans and while conflict with regional powers like Carthage was scary, Rome was up for the challenge.

There was mutual agreement between Rome and Carthage. In 509 B.C. the first treaty between Rome and Carthage took place (Cary and Scullard, 1975). In 348 B.C. Rome entered into another treaty with Carthage, whereby the Carthaginians were required not to obtain any permanent foothold in Latium and not to molest the towns which accepted Roman leadership (Polybius 1966). The Romans on the other hand allowed the Carthaginians to make slave hauls in the

independent Latin cities. A larger Carthaginian trade monopoly was allowed by the Romans, which gives the indication that the Romans were novice in trading activities. In 280 B.C. Rome and Carthage entered into a third agreement (Cary and Scullard, 1975). Despite these treaties, Rome harboured suspicion that Carthage might seek to control the Italian coast. In each of their treaties, Rome categorically stated that Carthage must not take any permanent foothold on Italian soil. However, in 264 B.C. Messina was thrown into the political market.

The First Punic War

Carthage considered itself the dominant naval power in the western Mediterranean. It originated as a Phoenician colony in Africa near modern Tunis, and gradually became the hub of a civilization whose hegemony reached across the North African coast and deep into its hinterland. It included the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Corsica, a limited area in southern Spain and the western half of Sicily. The conflict began after both Rome and Carthage intervened in the Sicilian city closest to the

Citation: Sophia Patience Graham (2021). The Roman Imperial Motives during the Middle Republican Era (264-147 BC). *Glob Acad J Humanit Soc Sci*; Vol-3, Iss-5 pp- 225-238.

Italian peninsula. At the beginning of the first Punic War, Rome had virtually no experience in naval warfare whereas Carthage had a great deal of experience on the seas which was based on its centuries of sea-based trade (Polybius 1966). Nevertheless, the growing Roman republic soon understood the importance of Mediterranean control in the outcome of the conflict.

The first major Roman fleet was constructed after the victory of Agrigentum in 261 B.C (Polybius 1966). In order to compensate for the lack of experience, and to make use of standard military tactics on sea, the Romans equipped their new ships with a special boarding device known as the *Corvus*. The Roman military was a land-based army while Carthage was primarily a naval power. This boarding-bridge allowed the Roman navy to cancel out some of Carthage's naval skills by using their marines to board Carthaginian ships and fight in hand to hand combat. The new weapon proved its worth in the Battle of Mylae, the first Roman naval victory and would continue to do so in the following years, especially in the huge Battle of Cape Ecnomus (Polybius 1966). The addition of the *Corvus* forced Carthage to review its military tactics and since the city had difficulty in doing so, Rome had the naval advantage. Duilius met Hannibal off northern Mylae in 260 B.C. Polybius states that the Carthaginians had one hundred and thirty ships, but does not give an exact figure for the Romans (Polybius 1966). The loss of seventeen ships at the Lipari Islands from a total of one hundred and twenty ships suggests that Rome had one hundred and three ships remaining. However, it is possible that this number was larger than one hundred and three, thanks to captured ships and the assistance of Roman allies.

The Carthaginians anticipated victory especially because of their superior experience at sea. The *Corvus* was very successful and helped the Romans seize the first thirty Carthaginian ships that got close enough. In order to avoid the *Corvus*, the Carthaginians were forced to navigate around them and approach the Romans from behind or from the side. The *Corvus* were usually still able to pivot and grapple most oncoming ships. Once an additional twenty of the Carthaginian ships had been hooked and lost to the Romans, Hamilcar Barca retreated with his surviving ships leaving Duilius with a clear victory (Polybius 1966). Instead of following the remaining Carthaginians at sea, Duilius sailed to Sicily to retrieve control of the troops. There, he saved the city of Segesta which had been under siege from the Carthaginian infantry commander Hamilcar. It is however uncertain how Duilius' decided not to immediately follow up with another naval attack since Hannibal's remaining eighty ships were probably still too strong for Rome to conquer.

In order to initiate her invasion of Africa, the Roman Republic constructed a major fleet, comprising transports for the army and its equipment and warships for protection (Bagnell1990). Carthage attempted to intervene with a fleet of three hundred and fifty ships but was defeated in the Battle of Cape Ecnomus (Polybius 1966). As a result of the battle, the Roman army commanded by Marcus Atilius Regulus landed in Africa and began ravaging the winning the Battle of Adys and forcing Carthage to sue for peace (Polybius 1966). The terms were lopsided that negotiations failed and in response Carthage hired Xanthippus, a Spartan mercenary to reorganize the army. Xanthippus defeated the Roman army and captured Regulus at the Battle of Tunis, and then managed to cut off what remained of the Roman army from her base by reestablishing Carthaginian naval supremacy (Polybius 1966). Meanwhile the Romans had sent a new fleet to pick up the survivors of her African expedition. Although the Romans defeated the Carthaginian fleet and were successful in rescuing her army in Africa, a storm destroyed nearly the entire Roman fleet on their way home. The number of casualties in the disaster may have exceeded ninety thousand men. The Carthaginians took advantage of this and attacked Agrigentum. They did not intend to hold the city so they burned it and left. The Romans were able to rally and quickly resumed the offensive. Along with constructing a new fleet of one hundred and forty ships, Rome returned to the strategy of taking the Carthaginian cities in Sicily one after the other.

Attacks began with naval assaults on Lilybaeum, the center of Carthaginian power on Sicily and a raid on Africa. Both efforts ended in failure. The Romans retreated from Lilybaeum and the African force was caught in another storm and destroyed (Polybius 1966). The Romans however made great progress in the north. The city of Thermae was captured in 252 B.C. enabling another advance on the port city of Panormus. The Romans attacked this city after taking Cephalodon in 251 B.C. After fierce fighting, the Carthaginians defeat led to the fall of the city. With Panormus captured, much of western inland Sicily fell with it. The cities of Solous, Petra and Tyndaris agreed to peace with the Romans that same year (Polybius 1966). The next year the Romans shifted their attention to the southwest. They sent a navalexpedition toward Lilybaeum. The Romans seized and burned the Carthaginian hold-out cities of Selinous and Heraclea Minor (Walbank 1990). This expedition to Lilybaeum was not successful but attacking the Carthaginian headquarters demonstrated Roman resolve to take all of Sicily (Polybius 1966). The Roman fleet was defeated by the Carthaginians at Drepana forcing the Romans to continue their attacks from land. Roman

forces at Lilybaeum were relieved and Eryx, near Drepana was seized thus menacing that important city as well.

Following the conclusive naval victory off Drepana in 249 B.C., Carthage ruled the seas as Rome was unwilling to finance the construction of yet another expensive fleet (Polybius 1966). However, the Carthaginian faction that opposed the conflict, led by the land-owning aristocrat Hanno the Great, gained power and in 244 B.C. considering the war to be over, started the demobilization of the fleet giving the Romans a chance to again attain naval superiority.

In 247 B.C., Carthage sent Hamilcar Barca (Hannibal's father) to Sicily. His landing at Heirkte (near Panormus) drew the Romans away to defend that port city and re-supply point and gave Drepana some breathing room (Polybius 1966).

Subsequent guerilla warfare kept the Roman legions pinned down and preserved Carthage's toehold in Sicily, although Roman forces which bypassed Hamilcar forced him to relocate to Eryx to better defend Drepana. In response to Hamilcar's raids, Rome did build another fleet paid for with donations from wealthy citizens and it was that fleet which rendered the Carthaginian success in Sicily futile, as the stalemate produced in Sicily by Hamilcar became irrelevant following the Roman naval victory at the Battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 B.C. where the new Roman fleet under consul Gaius Lutatius Catullus was victorious over an undermanned and hastily built Carthaginian fleet.

Carthage lost most of its fleet and was economically incapable of funding another, or of finding manpower for the crews. Without naval support, Hamilcar Barca was cut off from Carthage and forced to negotiate for peace and agreed to evacuate Sicily. It should be noted that Hamilcar Barca had a subordinate named Gesco, who conducted the negotiations with Lutatius, in order to create the impression that he had not really been defeated (Walbank 1990). Due to the difficulty of operating in Sicily, most of the first Punic War was fought at sea which includes the most decisive battles. But one reason the war bogged down into stalemate on the landward side was because ancient navies were ineffective at maintaining seaward blockades of enemy ports. Therefore, Carthage was able to reinforce and re-supply its besieged strongholds especially Lilybaeum on the western end of Sicily. Both sides of the conflict had publicly funded fleets. This fact compromised Carthage and Rome's finances and eventually decided the course of the war. Despite the Roman victories at sea, the Roman Republic lost countless ships and crews

during the war due to both storms and battles. On two occasions 255 B.C. and 253 B.C., whole fleets were destroyed in bad weather. The disaster off Camarina in 255 B.C. counted two hundred and seventy ships and over one hundred thousand men lost, the greatest single loss in history. Rome won the first Punic War after twenty three years of conflict and in the end, became the dominant naval power of the Mediterranean. In the aftermath of the war, both states were financially and demographically exhausted. Corsica, Sardinia and Africa remained Carthaginian, but they had to pay a high war indemnity. Rome's victory was greatly influenced by her persistence. The exact number of casualties on each side is always difficult to determine, moreover different scholars provide different figures. However (excluding land warfare casualties), Rome is said to have lost seven hundred ships (to bad weather and unfortunate tactical dispositions before battle) and at least part of their crews. Carthage is also said to have lost five hundred ships (to the new boarding tactics and later to the increasingly superior training, quantity and armament of the Roman navy) and at least part of their crews (Cary and Scullard 1975). Although uncertain, the casualties were heavy for both sides. Polybius commented that the war was at the time the most destructive in terms of casualties in the history of warfare, including the battles of Alexander the Great (1966). Analyzing the data from the Roman census of the third century B.C. Walbank noted that during the conflict Rome lost about fifty thousand citizens (1990). This excludes auxiliary troops and every other man in the army without citizen status, who would be outside the head count. The terms of the treaty of Lutatius designed by the Romans were particularly heavy for Carthage, which had lost bargaining power following its defeat at the Aegates Islands. Both sides agreed upon: Carthage evacuates Sicily and pays indemnity of three thousand, two hundred talents. Further clauses determined that the allies of each side would not be attacked by the other and that, no attacks were to be made by either side upon the other's allies and both sides were prohibited from recruiting soldiers within the territory of the other.

This denied the Carthaginians access to any mercenary manpower from Italy and most of Sicily although this later clause was temporarily abolished during the Mercenary War (Cary and Scullard 1975).

Motives of First Punic War

In 509 B.C. Carthage and Rome signed a friendship treaty. In 306, by which time the Romans had conquered almost the entire Italian peninsula, the two powers reciprocally recognized a Roman sphere of influence over Italy and a Carthaginian one over Sicily. But Italy was determined to secure

dominance over all of Magna Graecia (the areas settled by Greeks in and around Italy), even if it meant interfering with the dominance of Carthage in Sicily. Turmoil in Messina, Sicily, provided the opportunity the Romans were looking for. Mamertine mercenaries controlled Messina so when Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse attacked the Mamertines, the Mamertines asked the Phoenicians for help. They obliged and sent in a Carthaginian garrison. The Carthaginians overstayed then having second thoughts about the Carthaginian military presence, the Mamertines turned to the Romans for help. The Romans sent in an expeditionary force to send the Phoenician garrison back to Carthage. Carthage responded by sending in a large force to which the Romans responded with a full consular army.

In 262 B.C. Rome won many small victories, giving her control over almost all the entire island. But the Romans needed control of the sea for final victory since Carthage was a naval power. Rome's engagement in the first Punic War was influenced by her quest to expand her territories and establish dominion in the western Mediterranean. It was ultimately based on the need and desire for more territory (Champion 2004). Polybius' account on the construction of wartime vessels demonstrates that Romans most likely had not yet engaged in naval battles. If Polybius' account is true, then Roman motives for going to war over Sicily were not entirely about trade, but rather sought to have dominion over Sicily and to remove all foreign influence in Italy all together (1966). Should they succeed, Rome would achieve her idea to form an Italian confederacy. Moreover, Polybius' account of the treaty between Rome and Carthage which ended the first Punic War gives further credence to the idea that Rome fought for the annexation of Sicily and consolidation of Italy (1966). In the treaty, Carthage was to evacuate the whole of Sicily and they were to give up to the Romans all prisoners as ransom. The Carthaginians were to pay the Romans by installments in twenty years, three thousand, and two hundred Euboean talents. The Romans also demanded that they reduce the time of payment by one half, that they add one thousand talents to the indemnity and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy (Polybius 1966). Nevertheless the fact that Rome easily welcomed and accepted the alliance proposed by Hiero clearly reveals her desire to expand (acquire new territories) her control and influence into the Mediterranean. In this situation, why didn't Rome go to peaceful negotiation with Hiero II of Syracuse, who was then a powerful monarch but resorted to war if not for the motive of ambition and greed? In 263 B.C. Rome under the consul of Manius Valerius Maximus and Manius

Otacilius Crassus had completed a powerful build-up of troops in Sicily and many of the Sicilian cities had joined them. Convinced that Rome had gained vastly superior strength over Carthage by the acquisition of the Sicilian cities, Hiero wrote to the consuls and offered terms of peace neglecting earlier deals and terms he had made with Carthage. An alliance was thus concluded under which Hiero II gave back all prisoners-of-war without ransom and paid an indemnity of one hundred talents of silver. Rome easily accepted the offer in the view of gaining a safe base at Syracuse to secure their supplies. This budge was to gain grounds to fight with Carthage possibly for expansion and new territories. Another political motive for Roman imperialism was the need to defend her territory and to allay the fear of the threat of the Carthaginians. The Mamertines called for Roman aid when they experienced defeat at the hands of Hiero of Syracuse II in 268 B.C. The Romans indeed found themselves in dilemma by the appeal of the Mamertines and the conflicting feelings that affected them were only described by Polybius: 'the senate even after a long deliberation did not approve the proposal to help the Mamertines'(1966). From a moral point of view, Rome should have rejected the appeal with scorn. Rome was immoral in accepting the Mamertines appeal because they were pirates who pirated lands that do not belong to them-Messana (Dorey and Dudley1975). Rome having faced a similar pirate attack and coming out of it should have known better. Accepting the offer of the Mamertines was endorsing piracy within the western Mediterranean.

The Mamertines were land pirates who seized Messina by violence and had made it a base for acts of brigandage. Since the Romans had only recently overwhelmed a similar band in Rhegium and executed the survivors, they would be acting illogically if they took the Mamertines under Roman protection. However, the fear of the threat Carthage would pose should she have possession of Messina prompted Rome to act. Rome feared that if the Carthaginians took control of Messina they would have little difficulty in overcoming the Syracusans and so would gain control of the whole of Sicily. If this happens the Carthaginians would encircle Italy on every side and threaten every part of the country. Since the Romans were imperialistic and sought to control the Mediterranean through economic exploitation, thus Rome feared and decided to go to war (Dorey and Dudley 1975:19).

There was the fear that for the Carthaginians to occupy a position so close to Rome, she might pose serious threat to her security. The need to prevent a strong and potentially hostile power occupying a position close to Roman frontier could be used as a vintage point for attacks, and

therefore cracked the 'spines of Rome, hence the decision to go to war. Besides, after Rome had extended her influence to the sea coast of Italy, some of her leading men began to extend their aggrandizement beyond those sea-coasts and viewed with concern the fact that Carthage already held Sardinia and Corsica and was soon likely to control Sicily (Dorey and Dudley 1975). The emergence of this outlook together with others propelled the Romans towards intervention on the Mamertines' behalf. This confirms McClelland Theory of Needs that people who want power and control act in certain ways that merit the quest for power and dominion (1975:12). Besides, a possible defeat of the Carthaginians, as it might have been thought by the commanders and proponents of the war would be accompanied by such glory and enhanced reputation one could not ignore. The promotion of military glory of the leading Romans might have inspired the proposers of the alliance with Mamertines to push for war. They might have deliberately exaggerated the prospective economic benefits the war would bring to entice participation. Appius Claudius, the consul who gave command might have been one of the most active supporters of the war (Dorey and Dudley 1975).

His personal interest in the war could not be ignored either. Appius Claudius belonged to a family that pursued a traditional policy of expansion to the south. Interestingly, it is noteworthy that the consuls of 263 B.C. and 261 B.C. Manius and Titus Otacilius Crassus who were influential at that time belonged to families which during the second Punic War in the persons of T. Otacilius Crassus and M. Claudius Marcellus had close connections with Sicily. These two (Manius and Titus) were Campanians who had kinship ties with the Mamertines. The Campanians also had a national tradition of fighting as mercenaries in Sicily (Dorey and Dudley 1975). Their influence in Rome played a vital role in turning the scales in favour of the Mamertines.

Mommsen argues that Rome participated in the war in order to honour an invitation (1895). Such invitation from the Mamertines indicates her recognition of Rome as a superpower. Of course such a recognition and prestige accorded to Rome by the Mamertines could not be compromised. Such prestige again could be enhanced should Rome annex Sicily to her confederacy aspiration. As mentioned earlier, Rome had wanted to create a confederacy of Italian states and the addition of Sicily would be an advantage because Sicily is militarily and commercially positioned. Rome had consolidated her authority over the Latin states, the Etruscans, the Sabines and a number of Greek states following the defeat of King Pyrrhus. Sicily was to be part of it in order to protect her frontiers from any

invasion (Dorey and Dudley 1975). Moreover, Rome did not only engage in the first Punic War to have dominance over Italy, but was to unify the Italian region under one umbrella (Cary and Scullard 1975). Rome had extended her power to the sea-coast of Italy. Some of her leading men had begun to extend their horizon beyond those sea-coasts and viewed with concern the fact that Carthage already held Sardinia and Corsica and was soon likely to hold all Sicily too. To allow that meant the threat to the unification of all Italy. Rome was forced to react, daring the consequences.

Though Polybius argues that economic motives might not have been the reason for Rome going to war against Carthage; actors of the war might have harboured and considered economic benefits or the prospects of loot (1966). When the senate remained undecided to go to the first Punic War, supporters of the alliance with the Mamertines brought their proposal before the popular assembly. Here, they appealed to the people's material interests and held out hopes that profits to be won from the war in Sicily would make up for what was lost in the Pyrrhus Wars. The prospect of booty to be obtained from the wealthy city of Sicily should Rome win, propelled the populace to accept the war proposal (Polybius 1966).

This war might have been fought to satisfy Rome's aggressive nature. Harris argues that warfare bulked large amount the formative adolescent and adult experiences of the Roman aristocrats until the very late second century (1979).

The Roman aristocrat expected leadership in war to be the most important activity of his consulship should they succeed in rising to the highest office in the state. Success in war by far was the most glorious kind of achievement by which one could demonstrate his prowess. No one can hold a political office at Rome until he has completed ten annual military campaigns (Polybius 1966). The Romans relied for every purpose on *bia*-violence force (Polybius 1966).

This study agrees with Harris that, military success was not only a boost for the individual personal aims and interest, it was highly advantageous to the Roman state. To satisfy such quest, Rome pictures how a possible victory over Carthage would satisfy such desire and passion. Besides, the way and manner in which Roman soldiers massacred their opponent points to that personal ambition to subdue enemies and make name for them. Roman armies normally behaved more violently than Hellenistic armies. Polybius' records of Scipio Africanus' speech to his troops in

the subsequent second Punic War validates this claim (Polybius 1966).

When his forces had stormed New Carthage in 209 B.C, he directed most of them according to the Roman custom against the people in the city telling them to kill every one they meet and to spare no one (Dorey and Dudley 1975). According to Polybius even the cities that surrendered to Roman dominance were never spared of massacre (1966).

Rome's aggressive nature might be explained in the fact that she drew more strength and support from Italy than her opponent Carthage could pull from her home in North Africa. Rome had subdued most of the Italian tribes who came to own allegiance to them, and this study is of the view that a society in which a relatively large proportion of the population participates in the armed forces tends to show itself highly ferocious in warfare. Carthage on the other hand relied largely on mercenaries and oversees trade and did not possess much greater influence in North Africa. Some indications of the size of Rome's reserves of manpower can be obtained from the account given in Polybius the army list compiled at the time of Gallic invasion of 225 B.C., shows a grand total of over three quarters of a million. Rome perceived that her military advantage (numerical) might shape her imperial decision to wage war (Polybius 1966). Thus the above discussed motives confirms McClelland Theory of Needs which states that people want power and control act in certain ways that merit the quest for power and dominion (1975:12). Thus those who want power are more aggressive, wanting to control and direct affairs of others.

This study agrees with scholars such as Dorey and Dudley that Rome's intervention was an intentional step to acquire new and more territories. Rome's acceptance of the appeal as against the fact that the Mamertines were pirates attests to the fact. Rome wanted just any opportunity to wage war against Carthage's fast rise to power. In the same manner, Rome had made an alliance with the Samnites in 298 B.C. In fact, after the fall of Agrigentum, Roman ambitions to expand grew. For example, in 259 B.C. Rome began to contest Sardinia and seized Aleria, the most important city in Corsica (Nutton 1978). Besides, the enthusiasm which was gained even in the face of their catastrophic losses in 250 B.C. and 249 B.C., their resolution and the final efforts of 242/1 B.C. can best be explained by their desire to take the whole island into their possession. Such resilience led to Rome's acquisition of Sicily.

This paper views the Romans keeping a sharp eye on Spain for a long time and their policy was entirely concerned with the curbing of

Carthaginian expansion. In agreeing with Mommsen, Frank and the defensive school of thought, this paper is of the view that Rome did everything to protect her territory. Her participation in the war was in response to her fear of the growing power of Carthage and the prospect of controlling Sicily, and this was a boost to her economic monopoly in the western Mediterranean. Rome sought to end Carthage's monopoly and the much advantage she (Carthage) had gain in that region.

Conclusion on the motives of the first Punic War is viewed by writers such as Badian () and Frank () as that of fear and anxiety. Rome harboured genuine fear for the increasingly growing power of the Carthaginians who had been an ally and great help to the Roman defeat of King Pyrrhus. Rome wanted to remove that fear in the western Mediterranean. However this study regards the first Punic War as more of offensive than defensive on the part of Rome. Having secured central and southern Italy, attention had to move to the Mediterranean where Rome would have more access to wealthier and more formidable states to partner with. There emerged two superpowers in the Mediterranean-Rome and Carthage. There was the need for one to undo the other and dominate the region. Harris views the war as one for economic gains and control of overseas trade on the part of Rome (1979). Rome wanted to control trading activities within the Mediterranean. Personal glory and military renown also influenced Roman decision to go to war. Harris writes that commanders and senators oversaw the prestige, glory and honour to be accorded should Carthage fall to their heels (1979).

The Second Punic War

The second Punic War between Carthage and Rome was started by the dispute over the hegemony of Saguntum, a Hellenized Iberian coastal city with diplomatic contacts with Rome. After great tension within the city government culminating in the assassination of the supporters of Carthage, Hannibal laid siege to the city of Saguntum in 219 B.C. (Cary and Scullard 1975). The city called for Roman aid but the pleas fell on deaf ears since Rome at that particular moment had commitments in Illyria (Polybius 1966). Following a prolonged siege and a bloody struggle in which Hannibal himself was wounded and the army practically destroyed, the Carthaginians finally took control of the city (Cary and Scullard 1975). Many of the Saguntines chose to commit suicide rather than face the subjugation by the Carthaginians.

Before the war Rome and Hasdrubal had made a treaty. It was agreed that the Iberia should be the boundary between both empires and that the

liberty of the Saguntines should be preserved (Livy 1960). Several battles were fought during this sixteen year period of war.

In the Battle of Beneventum in 212 B.C., Hanno the Elder was again defeated, this time by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus who also captured his camp. The following battle was that of the Silarus, in the same year, where the Romans under Marcus Centenius were ambushed and lost all but one thousand of their sixteen thousand men. Also in 212 B.C. was the Battle of Herdonia, another Roman defeat when only two thousand Romans out of eighteen thousand men survived a direct attack by Hannibal's numerically superior forces combined with an ambush cutting off the Roman line of retreat (Toynbee 1965). This phase of the war was marked by the fall of major and minor cities to the Romans, although Hannibal was still able to prevail on the battlefield and thus lift some sieges. The Siege of Syracuse from 214 B.C. onwards was marked by Archimedes' ingenuity in inventing war machines that made it impossible for the Romans to make any gains with traditional methods of siege warfare (Polybius 1966). A Carthaginian army of twenty thousand men had been sent to relieve the city but suffered more heavily than the Romans from pestilence and was thus forced to retreat to Agrigentum. The fall of Syracuse was finally achieved by a Roman attack that was treacherously helped to enter the city by a Syracusan pro-Roman faction and resulted in the death of Archimedes (Cary and Scullard 1975).

In the Battle of Capua in 211 B.C. Hannibal tried to relieve his main harbour as in the previous year by luring the Romans into a pitched battle. He was unsuccessful and was also unable to lift the siege by assaulting the besiegers' defenses. Hannibal therefore tried a stratagem of staging a march towards Rome, hoping in this way to compel the enemy to abandon the siege and rush to defend their home city. However, only part of the besieging force left for Rome and under continued siege Capua fell soon afterwards (Polybius 1966). Near Rome he fought another pitched battle. The Battle of Herdonia 210 B.C. was another battle to lift the Roman siege of an allied city. Hannibal caught the proconsul Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus off guard during his siege of Herdonia and destroyed his army in a pitched battle with up to thirteen thousand Romans dead out of less than twenty thousand men. The defection of Salapia in Apulia in 210 B.C. was achieved by treachery. The inhabitants massacred the Numidian garrison and went over to the Romans.

In 210 B.C., the Battle of Numistro between Marcellus and Hannibal was inconclusive, but the Romans stayed on his heels until the inconclusive

Battle of Canusium in 209 B.C. In the meantime, this battle enabled another Roman army under Fabius to approach Tarentum and take it by treachery in the Battle of Tarentum 209 B.C. (Toynbee 1965). Hannibal at that time had been able to disengage from Marcellus and was only five miles away when the city, under the command of Carthalo (who was bound to Fabius by an agreement of hospitality) fell. The Battle of Grumentum was an inconclusive fight in 207 B.C. between Gaius Claudius Nero and Hannibal. In the aftermath of the battle, Nero was able to trick Hannibal into believing that the whole Roman army was still in camp. In the meantime Nero marched with a selected corps north and reinforced the Romans there to fight the Battle of the Metaurus against Hasdrubal. The Carthaginian force under Hasdrubal had left Iberia a year ago after the defeat at the Battle of Baecula and had been reinforced by Gallic and Ligurian mercenaries and allies. It is notable that they took the same route as Hannibal ten years previously but suffered fewer casualties, being rather better supported by mercenaries from the mountain tribes (Cary and Scullard 1975). At the Battle of Ilipa, large numbers of Celtiberian mercenaries in Carthaginian service confronted a mixed army of Romans and Iberians. Scipio Africanus Major employed a clever ruse. For several days, he drew up his army for battle with the Romans stationed in the centre of the line and their Iberian on the wings, but when the enemy offered battle, he eventually declined it. By this stratagem he convinced the Punic commanders Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco that they could expect the Romans to hold the centre of their line. On the day of the battle, the Roman force deployed earlier in the day and with the Romans posted on the wings of the line. In the rush to respond, the Carthaginians placed their best forces in the centre as usual, failing to see the unusual Roman deployment. Thus, the inferior Carthaginian mercenaries on the wings were severely beaten by the Romans. The Celtiberians deserted the Carthaginian camp that night. This catastrophic defeat sealed the fate of the Carthaginian presence in Iberia. It was followed by the Roman capture of Gades in 206 B.C. after the city had already rebelled against Carthaginian rule. A last attempt was made by Mago in 205 B.C. to recapture New Carthage while the Roman presence was shaken by a mutiny and an Iberian uprising against their new overlords. But the attack was repulsed. So in the same year, he left Iberia, setting sail from the Balearic Islands to Italy with his remaining forces (Polybius 1966). In 205 B.C. Mago landed in Italy. His arrival was followed by the Battle of Crotona (modern Crotona) until he was defeated in the Po Valley raid in 203 B.C (Cary and Scullard 1975). At the same time Scipio Africanus was given command of the legions in Sicily and was allowed to levy volunteers for his plan to end the war by invading

Africa. The legions in Sicily were mainly the survivors of Cannae who were not allowed home until the war was finished. Scipio was also one of the survivors and had served during the siege of Syracuse with them, but unlike the ordinary soldiers he then had been allowed home, had run successfully for public office and had been given command of the troops in Iberia.

Within a year of his landing in Africa, Scipio twice routed the regular Carthaginian forces under Hasdrubal Gisco and his Numidian allies. The main native supporter of the Carthaginians, king Syphax of the Massae-sylians (western Numidians) was defeated and taken prisoner (Cary and Scullard 1975). Masinissa, a Numidian rival of Syphax and at that time an ally of the Romans seized a large part of his kingdom with their help. These setbacks persuaded some of the Carthaginians that it was time to sue for peace. Others pleaded for the recall of the sons of Hamilcar Barca-Hannibal and Mago, who were still fighting the Romans in Bruttium and Cisalpine Gaul respectively (Cary and Scullard 1975:135).

In 203 B.C. while Scipio was carrying all before him in Africa and the Carthaginian peace party was arranging an armistice, Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon bronze tablets in the temple of Juno at Crotona, he sailed back to Africa (Cary and Scullard 1975). Hannibal's arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party which placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy. But Hannibal was opposed to this policy and tried to convince them not to send the untrained African levies into battle.

In 202 B.C. Hannibal met Scipio in a peace conference. Despite the two generals' mutual admiration, negotiations floundered according to the Romans due to 'Punic faith' meaning bad faith. This Roman expression referred to the alleged breach of protocols which ended the first Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum. Hannibal's perceived breaches of the idealized Roman military etiquette (i.e. Hannibal's numerous ambushes), as well as the armistice violated by the Carthaginians in the period before Hannibal's return (Cary and Scullard 1975).

The decisive battle soon followed. Unlike most battles of the second Punic War, the Romans had superiority in cavalry and the Carthaginians had superiority in infantry. The Roman army was generally better armed and a head taller than the Carthaginian. Hannibal had refused to lead this army

into battle because he did not expect them to be able to stand their ground. There had been very bitter arguments between him and the oligarchy. His co-general Hasdrubal Gisco was forced to commit suicide by a violent mob after he spoke in support of Hannibal's view that such troops should not be led into battle. Before the battle Hannibal gave no speech to his new troops only to his veterans (Cary and Scullard 1975).

Scipio countered an expected Carthaginian elephant charge which caused some of Hannibal's elephants to turn back into his own ranks, throwing his cavalry into disarray. Thus, the Roman cavalry was able to capitalize on this and drive the Carthaginian cavalry from the field. However, the battle remained closely fought and at one point it seemed that Hannibal was on the verge of victory. However, Scipio was able to rally his men and his cavalry returned from chasing the Carthaginian cavalry and attacked Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged attack caused the Carthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse. After their defeat, Hannibal convinced the Carthaginians to accept peace. Notably, he broke the rules of the assembly by forcibly removing a speaker who supported continued resistance (Cary and Scullard 1975). Carthage lost Hispania forever and it was reduced to a client state. A war indemnity of ten thousand talents was imposed and her navy was limited to ten ships to ward off pirates and was forbidden from raising an army without Rome's permission. The Numidians took the opportunity to capture and plunder Carthaginian territory. Half a century later, when Carthage raised an army to defend itself from these incursions, it was destroyed by Rome in the third Punic War (Cary and Scullard 1975).

Rome, on the other hand by her victory, had taken a key step towards domination of the Mediterranean world. The end of the war was not universally welcomed in Rome for reasons of both politics and morale. When the senate decreed upon a peace treaty with Carthage, Quintus Caecilius Metellus a former consul said he did not look upon the termination of the war as a blessing to Rome, since he feared that the Roman people would now sink back again into her former slumber from which it had been roused by the presence of Hannibal (Cary and Scullard 1975). This statement by Metellus is a clear indication that war was an utterly normal feature of Roman life. Others, most notably Cato, feared that if Carthage was not completely destroyed it would soon regain its power and pose new threats to Rome and pressed for harsher peace conditions. Even after the peace, Cato insisted on the destruction of Carthage, ending his speeches with 'Carthago delenda est-furthermore, I think Carthage must be destroyed', even if they had nothing to do

with Carthage. Polybius identified three main causes of the second Punic War. The first was the behaviour of Hamilcar and the son Hannibal Barca; the second had to do with the inconsistency in Roman behaviour and the third is the capture of Spain by Hannibal. These three factors were shaped by certain motives that brought them to bear.

The imperial motives for the second Punic War was to defend the interest of Rome in the Spanish world. The war was sparked off by Carthaginian conquest of Spain. Immediately after the Mercenary War, Hamilcar led troops to Spain. At that time Carthaginian influence was confined to a comparatively small area in the south-west, mostly centered on Gades since most of her territories have been taken over by Rome after the first Punic War. In the course of nine years 238-229 B.C., Hamilcar extended Carthaginian territory over most of Spain (Polybius 1966). This is an exactly colonial system of exploitation based on military conquest, the imposition of tribute and the taking off of the characterized Carthaginian hegemony (Dorey and Dudley 1975).

The Romans did not let Hamilcar's operations in Spain go unnoticed and in 231 B.C. sent a delegation to try and ascertain what his real objectives were. Hamilcar sent them back with the excuse that his conquest had been necessitated by the need to pay the war indemnity to the Romans. After Hannibal had succeeded Hasdrubal, he began to subdue the remaining tribes south of the Ebro by 220 B.C. The only remaining independent state was Saguntum. Dominion in Spain gave Carthage a base of operation for war against Rome. Carthage invited resources both in men and materials for a protracted struggle and a sense of confidence in the superiority of her troops. In 226/225 B.C. Rome was engaged in war with the Gauls and after the Gallic peril (Gauls attack) had receded formed diplomatic relationship with Saguntum ostensibly to serve as a bridgehead for possible future operation against Carthage. Therefore as later Saguntum was attacked by Hannibal, Rome had no choice than to response to the former's appeal for help. Rome's response was to defend her own position as victory and subsequent annexation of Saguntum by Carthage could prove suicidal for them. Thus, it is obvious Rome's original decision to take the city of Saguntum into alliance was the very action which gave meaning to the capture of Saguntum.

The second Punic War was fought by Rome based on the imperial motives that are now discussed. Holleaux writes that Rome went to this war on an invitation (1921). However, Rome possibly had several other imperial reasons for going to the war. Rome, especially the senate, was

unwilling to go to war once again with Carthage on behalf of Saguntum. But when the news arrived that Hannibal had taken Saguntum by storm after eight months siege, there was a violent emotional reaction at Rome and the war party gained the upper hand (Dorey and Dudley 1979). Already, Hannibal's father, Hamilcar, had built a foundation of threat to Rome by his actions when he was alive (Toynbee 1965). For nearly seven years, he had held out on Herctae and Eryx. Hamilcar had never been defeated and had only capitulated because of the failure of the Carthaginian government to keep him supplied. Hamilcar was thus embittered at the way in which the Romans went back on the terms that he had agreed with Catullus and wanted to get his revenge.

Moreover he represented the commercial interest that was oriented towards the Mediterranean world and looked back to the older traditional policy of Carthage, of establishing a monopoly in the carrying trade and that was the family tradition inherited by Hannibal. Rome thus feared that failure to eliminate him would bring disaster. An ultimatum was given that the Carthaginians should surrender Hannibal and his team to Rome on the immediate declaration of war. A peace broker could not be reached and war was declared. Besides, Rome thought she could not look unconcerned and allow her ally to be subdued, since her action will compel the other allies to lose faith in Rome (Dorey and Dudley 1975).

Again, the issue of who must dominate the Mediterranean which is based on superiority complex inspired the war. The two states-Rome and Carthage, were a pain in the neck of each other. It is obvious both Rome and Carthage were imperialistic states and that Roman policy was anti-Carthaginian. None could tolerate the dominance of the other. Hamilcar's actions, making Hannibal swear an oath of vengeance and Rome's violent emotional reaction to the news that Hannibal had taken Saguntum and the immediate final ultimatum given to Carthage tells it all that none could tolerate the other. Even the negotiation process was interspersed with intolerance. 'Rome demanded that the Carthaginians should surrender Hannibal and his staff' (Polybius 1966). The Carthaginians responded that Hannibal was not guilty of any breach of treaty, but Rome would not listen and the war began.

Economic motive played its role with the view that the war would improve Roman economic status. While pro-Roman writers did not directly demonstrate that this war was about economic gain through trade, it is clear that through the terms of the treaty, the war was at least on some economic level. According to Polybius, the Carthaginian after their defeat were to surrender their ships of war

with the exception of ten triremes (1966). Without their former naval power, the Carthaginians would be hard pressed to continue trading on such a scale as they once enjoyed. This left Rome as the most dominant naval power in the western Mediterranean both military and commercially.

Imperial motive discussed above confirms Marxist theory of imperialism which states that imperialism consists not necessarily in the direct control of one country by another, but in the economic exploitation of one region by another or of a group by another. Rome capitalized on an invitation by an ally to enhance her prestige. She could not refuse the invitation to protect an ally who badly needed her help and protection. Saguntum had formed diplomatic relationship with Rome and deemed it appropriate to call for her intervention. An invitation to Rome indicated her recognition by the invitee as a superpower. Today, states, especially the third world countries, call for international support when in political crises. Rome might have misunderstood Carthage's reasons for attacking Saguntum. Carthage claimed that the Saguntines were interfering with the *Torboletai*, a neighbouring tribe that was subject to Carthage. Carthage insisted she had not breached her treaty with Rome but Rome thought otherwise and demanded Hannibal's head.

There is also the possibility of the second Punic War being inspired by hatred or contempt for Carthage and her possible rise to superpower status and a force in the western Mediterranean. Livy's account on how hatred for each other intensified their clash on battlefield authenticates the point. According to Livy the 'hatred with which they (Rome and Carthage) fought was almost greater than their resources' (1960). The propaganda, the excuse with which Rome explained her position cannot be ignored. There is no absolute evidence for the existence of any treaty between Rome and Saguntum (Dorey and Dudley 1975). Recent examinations of the problem by Professor Badian and Bagnell show the relationship between the two was one of *fides* (an informal relationship which put the Romans under a moral obligation not to injure Saguntines themselves, but did not lay them under any binding obligation to protect her from third parties) (1963;1990). It is even doubtful whether the relationship of *fides* had even been established. Pure hatred for Carthage's rise by the war party meant even relying on propaganda to achieve their aim of war. Rome acted on contempt or hatred for Carthage, and this paper believed Rome was wrong. There is no absolute evidence that Saguntum was an ally of Rome (Lazenby 1978). There is no evidence for the existence of any treaty between Rome and Saguntum. Rome was inspired by the need to satisfy

her aggressive tendencies. This is meshed in her inconsistent behaviour towards the affairs in the Mediterranean (Dorey and Dudley 1975). During the revolt Rome had acted with complete modesty and had observed the spirit of the recent treaty (after the first Punic War) 'that there should be friendship between Rome and Carthage'. Rome encouraged merchants who were bringing supplies to Carthage and imposed ban on sending supplies to the mercenaries. When Utica and Sardinia who had joined the revolt offered to submit to Rome and placed themselves under her protection, Rome refused to accept the offer. However in 238 B.C. after the revolt had been suppressed and the Carthaginians were preparing an expedition to recover Sardinia, the Romans intervened seized the island and declared war on Carthage on the grounds that the Carthaginians' preparations were directed against Rome. Rome now claimed that Sardinia belonged to them, and only agreed to renew the peace treaty after the Carthaginians had formally ceded Sardinia and paid an additional indemnity of twelve hundred talents. This unjustified annexation of Sardinia and the ruthless imposition of indemnity gave Carthage a national grievance against Rome. Rome's ability to act in whatever way she wanted whenever goes to show her absolute impunity and aggressiveness.

However, the second Punic War was to defend Rome against external aggression by Hannibal who was annexing several territories within the Mediterranean.

Conclusion on the Motives for the Second Punic War

The second Punic War is viewed by Bagnell as defensive on the part of Rome (1990). Rome could not risk the possible rise of Carthage and needed to maintain the status quo Roman dominance. This view is shared by Badian and Frank. There was genuine fear for the house of Barca and their intentions towards Rome (1968). Errington dismisses the notion of the wrath of the Barcids and thinks that Roman policy towards Spain was directed by nothing more than apathy (1971). Besides, Rome wanted to defend her interest in the Mediterranean. Superiority complex, the need to control trading activities as expressed by Harris and invitation might have inspired the war (1979). This paper views hatred or contempt for Carthage might have inspired the war. According to Livy, the hatred with which the two nations that is Carthage and Rome fought were almost greater than their resources (1960).

Scholars such as Lazenby regard the reasons cited for the second Punic War as being interspersed by propaganda (1978). Rome claimed

she has special relationship with Saguntum and that Rome has the moral obligation to protect it. However, Harris writes there are no special relationship between Rome and Saguntum which gave the former the moral obligation to protect her (1979). This paper agrees Rome fought the second Punic War in order to control trading activities in the Mediterranean. As expounded by Lenin in his studies on imperialism that government in a bid to solve such problems conquered new territories in search for new markets and to dominate trade. Rome in search of new market and properly establish dominant trading posts within the Mediterranean had to fight off Hannibal.

The Third Punic War

In the years following the Battle of Zama and the defeat of Hannibal in the second Punic War, Rome and Carthage maintained an adversarial conqueror and conquered relationship. During these fifty years of payments, there had been no occasion when Carthage had misbehaved to cause anxiety in Rome (Polybius 1966). Rome continued to expand in the east, while dealing with problems in their newly acquired Spanish territories. Rome also continued to support her Numidian ally Masinissa, even discreetly encouraging invasion of Carthaginian lands while Carthage was left to beg for Roman intervention (Cary and Scullard 1975).

Immediately after the second Punic War, Hannibal Barca maintained his power in Carthage and did considerable work to clean up corruption and economic problems within the nation, but his enmity with Rome eventually forced his expulsion. By the time the Romans were going to war with Antiochus III of Syria, Hannibal had been forced into exile and he had joined this new Roman enemy (Haywood 1933).

Hannibal's departure from Carthage did little to endear Carthage to the untrusting and vengeful Romans. Terms of the treaty with Rome forced Carthage to give up its army and pay heavy 'indemnity'. The regime that replaced Hannibal attempted to use this new found economic fortune to make for peaceful relations with their old nemesis, but to no avail. Attempts to pay off their annual tribute in one lump sum in 191 B.C. were denied (to prevent the release of the obligation that Carthage would continue to owe to Rome), and grain shipments meant as gifts to help the Romans in Greece and Macedonia were received and paid for in full by the senate. The Romans were not in favour of any relationship that might be seen as requiring reciprocal favours. Masinissa and his large Numidian army made a regular pattern of incursions against Carthage (Cary and Scullard 1975). Major efforts were launched about every decade since the end of

the second Punic War. The years 193, 182, 172, and 162 B.C. all witnessed Numidian advances. At first, despite Roman bias towards Masinissa, Rome was slightly less one sided against Carthage, but by the 170's and 160's B.C., this attitude took a sudden turn. The invasion of 162 B.C. and the resulting requests for help from Carthage were ignored (Cowel 1967). Masinissa was allowed to keep his gains and relations soured even further. The next decade, the 150s B.C., saw increased Numidian activity and frequent embassies from Carthage to Rome with each request for aid being denied in turn. Yet despite Rome always favouring Masinissa's cause, no effort was made to declare war themselves, leaving the policing of Carthaginian resurgence to their Numidian allies. Whereas Carthage remained a troubling worry for Rome ever since Hannibal, there were enough senators in Rome who wanted peace, or a real justification for war, before allowing the pro-war senators to have their way.

Repeated Numidia raids brought the situation to a head in the late 150's B.C. By 153 B.C. complaint from Carthage compelled the Romans to send a delegation (essentially a spy mission) to Carthage headed by Cato. In investigating the claims of injustice, the Romans inspected all areas of Carthaginian territory. Cato in particular was disturbed at the apparent wealth of Carthage and the prosperity of its countryside. Upon returning to Rome, Cato made it his mission to inspire the Romans to war against Carthage once again to prevent a possible rebirth of Carthaginian power (Cary and Scullard 1975). Cato made a speech before the senate where he dramatized the danger of Carthage to Rome. Shaking the folds of his toga, some large African figs fell to the ground as if by accident. As the senators admired the figs' size and natural beauty, Cato went on to explain that the origin of these magnificent specimens was only three days away by sail (Plutarch 1864). It was likely that Cato meant to show that the terms of the Roman peace treaty did nothing to hamper the newfound economic prosperity of Carthage (Cary and Scullard 1975). It may interest one to know how economic growth in Carthage could bring about war. In just a short time, Carthage was building to a position which may again be a threat to Rome. Cato's most predominant reason was misguided fear. Whatever the angle meant by this display, Cato made it his cause to inspire war. From this point until war was finally declared, Cato uttered the famous line after every comment in the forum, 'ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam' (commonly referred to as Carthago delenda est) which translates as 'besides which, my opinion is that Carthage must be destroyed' (Cat.Mai.26). It has been recorded that he

used the line at times after every sentence he spoke, regardless of the subject matter of his statements.

Roman lack of response to Carthaginian concerns led to a change in Carthaginian government. A party in opposition to appeasement of Rome had come to power by 151 B.C. It was at this time that Masinissa laid siege to a Carthaginian town, and the new government decided its attempts to get Roman intervention had been exhausted. An army of twenty five thousand raw recruits was raised and it attempted to lift the siege. The Numidians crushed the inexperienced army but worse yet, a military tribune; Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemelianus (grandson of Scipio Africanus through adoption) was there to witness the battle. Sent from Spain to arrange for the delivery of some war elephants from Masinissa, he just happened to be on hand for the slaughter. A report issued on the affair to Rome was interpreted as a Carthaginian violation of their treaty rather than a description of a great Numidian victory. As a result the Carthaginians were stripped of their ability to defend themselves and were not allowed to raise an army or conduct war without Roman approval, and conditions were moving ever closer to a state of war.

New attempts by Carthage to appease the Romans were ignored and the Carthaginian city of Utica offered itself in unconditional surrender to Rome before war even broke out (Gruen 2004). Hopelessness reigned supreme for the Carthaginians with good reason. By 149 B.C. more attempts by African envoys proved to be unsuccessful. Rome finally declared war and sent two consular armies of eighty thousand infantry and forty thousand cavalry from Sicily to Utica, only ten miles from Carthage itself. Once these armies arrived in Utica, a panicked populace complied with any Roman demand including the surrender of their arms: over two hundred thousand sets of armor and two thousand siege weapons (Polybius 1966). Pushing the limits, the consuls seemed unable to push Carthage into war, but one demand finally inspired the enemy. The Carthaginians were told to abandon the city of Carthage so it could be razed as punishment for disobedience, but the population was free to leave and settle anywhere within existing Carthaginian territory so long as it was at least ten miles from the sea (Cary and Scullard 1975). Carthage finally woke up, realizing that war was the only option, since failure to put up resistance will certainly lead to the destruction of Carthage, and they therefore got prepared to meet their invaders. While Carthage prepared for a siege, the Roman army suffered greatly from disease. Badly hampered by losses, they were unable to attack Carthage before the Carthaginians were ready. Minor attacks on towns outside of the city were conducted but little was

really accomplished. It was not until 147 B.C. that the senate felt a change was in order. Since the campaigns of Scipio Africanus and his victory over Hannibal at Zama, it was believed that Carthage could not be defeated without a Scipio in command, and the man who had first reported the Carthaginian breaking of the treaty was elected consul. Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemelianus took command and immediately made strides. Forcing the enemy to withdraw within the city of Carthage, he blockaded the harbour to prevent supply and laid waste to the countryside. By the winter of 147/146 B.C, the Romans occupied the outskirts of Carthage and were prepared for a final attack.

The spring of 146 B.C. opened with an assault on the city. Six days of brutal street fighting was a testament to both dire Carthaginian resistance and determined Roman resolve.

First capturing the walls and then surrounding the citadel, the Romans were free to wreak havoc on the civilian population. Before the final Carthaginian surrender, a city of some seven hundred thousand people was reduced to as few as fifty thousand defenders. Upon finally giving up, these remaining forces were rounded up and sold into slavery. In the aftermath, despite Scipio's objections, he was ordered to demolish the city of Carthage. Taking every bit of plunder they could, the Romans destroyed the harbour, demolished all large stone structures and burned the city for ten days. (Despite popular opinion, the salting of the land afterward to prevent repopulation was a story introduced long after the fact and may not have happened at all.) Carthage with its status as a power of the ancient world was finally destroyed, and even the city itself would not be successfully rebuilt until the reign of Augustus, which is one hundred and fifty years later (Cary and Scullard 1975).

Motives for the Third Punic War

The Roman motive for going to war with Carthage for the third time and the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. showed the rude craftiness of senatorial policy. Rome had acted out what she believed to be political necessity or expediency, not from any desire for territorial expansion. Rome had wanted to finish off an already weakened state of Carthage to prevent her possible chance of revival. Her rise again would challenge Rome's hard earned dominion; Rome was not ready for that. With Carthage destroyed already in the two previous wars, Rome was able to take dominion over all of North Africa and eliminated the only threat to Roman dominance in the western Mediterranean for good.

Rome wanted to consolidate Roman superiority over Carthage. By 155 B.C. the outstanding factor was the supremacy of Rome within the Mediterranean. In Polybius' view the Roman victory over Macedon in 168 B.C. had made Rome unchallengeable, 'For the future nothing remained but to accept the supremacy of the Romans and to obey her command' (1975). Rome was bent on consolidating her dominance in the western Mediterranean and finally nails Carthage to prevent her future rise.

Previous success and victory over Carthage inspired Rome to engage the Carthaginians for the third time. Roman conquest of Italy in the year leading to the third Punic War gave the Romans confidence in their military invincibility. Their success at unifying most part of Italy under one Roman umbrella and the two successive wars against Carthage did give Rome the psychological 'upper hand' to urge them into the third war. Besides, the two were unevenly matched. Rome was now the dominant power in the Mediterranean world. Carthage commanded no more than the resources of a powerful city state. Once war had begun, a Roman victory was inevitable and in the end Carthage was totally destroyed.

The war started also because of the personal ambition of the Roman commanders. Military renown, greed, fear, enmity and the destiny of individuals played an important role. Cato had wanted personal and ultimate glory (Harris 1979). It is not surprising that Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemelianus did not take any share of the booty and plunder. Thus self-restraint could be shrewdly combined with self-promotion. Rome probably was complacent and thought Rome could easily defeat Carthage as they did in the previous Punic Wars. This paper is of the view that the war of 147-146 was not based on Roman defense but expropriation of land was the main motive.

Rome was driven to war in 149 B.C. by anxiety about the growing power of Carthage (Toynbee 1965). Carthage, which had been previously defeated by Rome in the first and second Punic Wars, was gaining economic grounds. It became clear that Carthage had made a rapid economic recovery in 191 B.C. when she was in a position to offer to pay off the war indemnity to Rome in full. Such recovery was attained through several means. Hannibal instituted some reforms which brought gains. He made reforms in the agricultural sector. Carthage had untapped resources in the fertility of African agriculture, which had been previously underdeveloped because of the claims of Carthage's empire in Spain. Her

mercantile marine was still a source of strength (Polybius 1966).

In the third Punic War, the propaganda that Carthage was rising to superpower status as explained by Cato was misleading. There is no evidence that the store was increased nor was it likely that any Roman mission discovered enough about Carthaginian armories to alarm the senate (Harris 1979). Carthage did indeed show a will to resist but only after Rome's murderous demand that Carthage transfer their maritime city ten miles inland. There is also no evidence that Carthage had long been displaying a mood of militant revanchist (Harris 1979). More so, it is really doubted if Cato really went to Africa. Both accounts by Appian and Plutarch were a way of justifying Roman behaviour that Carthage still posed a threat (1912; 1864). Such propaganda was to conceal Roman aggressiveness and quest for power. The Roman and the Carthaginian War of 149-146 B.C. was an attack by a powerful state against one of its less powerful neighbour's. A war of sheer persecution (Cary and Scullard 1975). The third Punic War had to do with the consolidation of Roman power. This is described as total massacre of Carthage by Rome. It should be noted that personal ambition of the Roman commanders could not be ignored. This proves Harris' assertion that war gave Roman officers opportunities both to win personal distinctions and to provide largesse for the soldiers (1979).

Conclusion on the Third Punic War

Third Punic War is viewed by Lazenby and Harris as essentially defensive with very little defensive connotation (1978; 1979). Harris writes that mere propaganda was used by Roman historians to hide their offensiveness (1979). Roman historians and the senators especially Cato, projected Carthage as a rising strong state that could pose serious threat to Roman interests in the Mediterranean. Carthage however was a weak state that needed rejuvenation. This research partially agrees that the war was purely an offensive one in which Rome consolidated her power. Rome needed to 'finish off' her enemy in order to prevent her possible rise. This goes on to agree with Harris that the Roman state made war every year except in the most abnormal circumstances (1979). This is obviously a defensive mechanism. Due to fear, Cato was right in insisting on the total destruction of the enemy. As Taba postulates, the unsatisfied need causes physical or psychological tension within the individual leading him to engage in some kind of behaviour, to satisfy the need and thereby reduce the tension by working towards a goal (1999). Whether the issue of propaganda played its role or not, the interest of Rome was paramount.

REFERENCING

- Livy. *The Early History of Rome*. Trans. Audrey DeSelincourt. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1960.
- Polybius. *The Rise of the Roman Empire*. Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1966.
- Plutarch. *Lives of Illustrious Men*. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1864.
- Virgil. *The Aeneid*. Trans. W.F. Jackson Knight. England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1956.

Secondary Text

- Badian, E. *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968.
- Badian, E. *Foreign Clientelae 264-70 B.C.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958.
- Bagnall, N. *The Punic Wars 264-146 B.C.* Great Britain: Osprey Publishing Limited, 1990.
- Cary and Scullard. *A History of Rome: Down to the Reign of Constantine*. 3rd Ed. London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1975.
- Champion, C. B., Ed. *Roman Imperialism*. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 124
- Dorey and Dudley. *Roman Society*. Great Britain: Pelican Books, 1975.
- Engels, F and Marx, K. *On Colonialism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959.
- Frank, T. *Roman Imperialism*. New York: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1925.

- Harris, W.V. *On War and Greed in the Second Century B.C.* Ed. Craige Champion. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004.
- Holleaux, M. *Rome*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921.
- Hopkins, K. *Death and Renewal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Mommsen, T. *The History of Rome*. Trans. William P. Dickson. New York: 1895.
- McClelland, D.C. *Power- the Inner Experience*. New York: Irvington Press, 1975.
- Toynbee, A.J. *Hannibal's Legacy: The Hanniballic War's Effects on Roman*
- *Life*. Vol.1. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Walbank, F.W. *Polybius*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

Articles and Journal

- Badian, E. 'Roman Imperialism in the Late Republican Era. *Communications of the University of South Africa*. B.26. (1963): Pp83. Lazenby. 'John Francis Hannibal's War. (1978): ISBN 978-0806130040.
- Maslow, A. *A Theory of Human Motivation*. (1943): vol.50, Pp370-96.
- Taba, H. 'Curriculum Development- Harcourt Breuce and World'. *The Teacher* (April-June 1993): Vol.4. No 1.