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Original Research Article

The Role of Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) in Policing Crude Oil Bunkering in Akwa Ibom State

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*Corresponding Author Aliyu Mustapha Department of Criminology and Security Studies, Federal University of Kashere, Gombe State, Nigeria	Abstract: The study investigates the role of Nigeria security and civil defense corps in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. The ex-post factor design was used to generate data for the study. The population was 2173 respondents from were a sample of 337 was selected through stratified and simple random sampling technique. A 24- item self-developed questionnaire was the instrument used to collect data. Using the Pearson Product Moment
Article History Received: 12.04.2023 Accepted: 08.05.2023 Published: 22.05.2023	Correlation Coefficient (r) at 0.05 level of significance, the results among others showed that safeguarding oil facilities and policing of crude oil bunkering activities are positively and significant related; partnership by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering are positively related and significant; significant positive relationship exist between NSCDC activities and policing of crude oil; and finally, funding of NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering are significant and positively related. Accordingly, it is recommended, among others, that Behaviour change communication (BCC) strategy is necessary to re-orient and re-conscientize security operatives for the need for synergy to ensure security effectiveness on oil bunkering activities in Akwa Ibom State. Keywords: Role, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, Policing, Crude Oil,

Bunkering, Security.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1956, Nigeria's first oil well was struck at Oloibiri in the present day Bayelsa State. Then, Nigerians and the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta in particular were all filled with hope of the good that will come from oil as they were promised by the colonial masters. But after over 58 years of oil production activities, these hopes are yet to be satisfied and these communities have been suffering from various impacts of oil exploration and exploitation (Onuoha, 2013:18). This has led to the scholarly debate of oil resources can be a blessing or curse (Mahler, 2010; Obi, 2010a; Ezirim, 2010). The management of oil revenue cannot be divorced from the unbalanced connection between oil resources and the standard of living of the people of the oil producing communities. When the management of oil resources as well as political power is left in the hands of the few ruling class whom have been argued to think selfishly along ethnic lines, it has created a situation of 'rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer' and poverty in the midst of wealth. It therefore has become a situation where each of the ethnic groups struggles to wield power with the ultimate aim of holding control over the oil wealth (Obi, 2003). This has led the successive governments in Nigeria to see the oil wealth as spoils of office where the allocation of oil

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blocks and app5intments into the positions of management in the oil sector is reserved for those with political connections (Oluwajuyitan, 2011).

This has led to the consequent differing levels of violent and criminal behaviours from those that suffer the harsh conditions of oil explorations. This violent and criminal behaviours, they argue is to gain or retain access to the oil economy (Onuoha, 2013; Ezirim, 2010; Oluwajuyitan, 2011). This situation produced an economy of conflict, filled with great violence as an approach towards the appropriation of oil resources, and a growing market of illegal trading in crude oil and refined petroleum products (Ikelegbe, 2005).

These violent and criminal activities have led the country to lose lots of resources as it was estimated that between 1999 and 2007, the Niger Delta crisis cost Nigeria about 300,000 barrels per day in oil production, translating to the loss of about \$58.3 billion (Amanze-Nwachukwu and Okwuonu, 2007). This violence has been connected to illegal oil bunkering, crude oil theft, pipeline vandalisation, and illegal refineries which have become a thriving and lucrative businesses in the Niger Delta generally and Akwa Ibom State in particular (Saliu and Luqman, 2009; Dominic, 2016).

Many measures have been put in place by the Nigerian government over the year to forestall the problem of illegal oil bunkering. These measures include: closing its borders with neighbours, signing contracts for the supply of oil products, the use of a joint task force to fight illegal oil bunkering etc. (The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010). Shell on their own part in 2003 proposed a strategy similar to the Kimberly process for tracing rough diamonds, when they offered to issue certifications for oil exports based on chemical fingerprinting of crude oil to trace any oil being sold on the open market (Nwanma, 2003). The government of the federal republic furthering their effort in 2009 through the government of President Yar'Adua granted amnesty to militants in the Niger Delta, to unconditionally exonerate them of culpability in the myriad crimes (illegal oil bunkering, hostage-taking, pipeline and oil installation destruction) with which they have been associated (Nwozor 2010; Davidheiser and Nyiayaana, 2011). Notwithstanding all these efforts, Nigeria continues to lose huge revenue to oil theft and illegal oil bunkering. Therefore, this study shall be looking at the challenges and prospects of policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Even though there has been lots of work relating to oil bunkering in Nigeria and Akwa Ibom in particular, but some of them have focused on the violence and its cause being the weakness of the Nigerian state (Obi 2010b). While some others (Saliu and Lugman, 2009; Omofonmwan and Odia, 2009; Inokoba and Imbua 2010; Obi, 2010a) have argued that the violence and the illegal bunkering is as a result of frustration and anger from long period of suppression, exploitation and environmental degradation. Those who have written on illegal oil bunkering (Rim-Rukeh *et al.*, 2008; Garuba, 2010; Jonah, 2010; Adegbite, 2013) have concentrated on its effect on the economy; analyising the financial worth of oil lost to illegal bunkers. And little have been done on the specific area of policing crude oil bunkering, which informs the reason for this study to bridge the gap in literature and suggest possible solutions to the challenges of policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are various theoretical explanations for actions that are commendable as well as prime causal factors of vandalism that in itself is a criminal offense liable to 45 years jail term. On the one hand, exchange theory is employed to discuss the operation of NSCDC, with regard to it admirable approach to work. On the other hand, the theory of modernity and the rational choice theory are used to explain the rational but destructive approaches of the vandals. The theory of George Homan presents the corps as a group of personnel with positive ideology. To Homan, human interaction at all levels is governed by reward and punishment. People exhibit various behavioural traits when they enter into interaction and each of the people in interaction carry with them portable aspects of self, such as values, beliefs and sentiments which are freely expressed to attract reward, gains or profits and avoid punishment and losses (Charles, 2005).

Based on the aforementioned assumption of Homan, the social world is a market place where people 'chaffer and wrangle' to get better of the other person. However, the notion is not about the corps entering into interaction with the vandals but it is the multiplicity of approaches of the effective operation strategies of the corps on the one hand, and the safety of the communities, the people and the oil pipelines, and maintaining the alliance with the government of their father land on the other hand. The goodwill of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps will sustain it interaction that every person be it the individual, Nigerian groups and/or government would long for its service.

In the context of self-actualization, the vandals seem to be established in the concept of modernization, where there is freedom of choice, advanced technology and other prevailing features of modern world are in operation. In the view of Emile Durkheim, modernization is understood in terms of organic solidarity and the awakening of collective consciousness (Ritzer, 2008). While Organic Solidarity brings freedom and increase productivity, it also poses a series of problems. Taking advantage of modern ideology, actors play down on the conventional and societal values thereby creating the world of anomie.

Besides being pushed by the modernization ideology to breach the law of the land, the rational choice theory of the criminologists is on the opinion that committing crime is solely a personal issue. A decision to vandalize oil pipeline is a carefully, wellarticulated plan of the individual or a group of persons, it does not just occur by accident. A decision to vandalize oil pipeline may be based on a variety of personal reasons, including greed, revenge, need, anger, jealousy, thrill seeking or vanity. Cesare Beccaria, a social thinker of the classical school of criminology viewed crime in terms of both offense and offender specific. A crime offense- specific because offender reacts is selectively to the characteristics of a particular crime. For instance, a decision to commit vandalism involves evaluation of the targets, the likely cash yield, the available resources such as empty drums, means of conveying the stolen gasoline as the case may be, and the probability of being caught by the NSCDC patrol team.

A crime is offender-specific because criminals are not simply driven people who for one reason or the other, engage in random antisocial acts. Before deciding to commit crime, they analyze whether they have what it takes to be successful; they carefully evaluate their skills, motive, needs and fear (Conklin, 2007). In this case the offenderspecific and offence- specific are means to an end (The end is the commission of a particular crime). Therefore, if the means are not available the end is not accomplished. Although (Seigel, 2005) believes that crime commission brings rewards, excitement, prestige, or other desirable outcome without lengthy work or effort, although the statement is not to encourage criminality.

In Udousoro (2010) it is argued that while punishment is needed to preserve the equity disturbed by crime, punishment should commensurate with the seriousness of the crime committed. This seems to be the accepted proposition by the NSCDC. It is also argued that since crime is a rational choice, it can be controlled or eradicated by convincing potential offenders that crime is an unhealthy choice, which can never bring anything other than suffering, hardship and pains.

RESEARCH METHODS Research Design

The design adopted for this study was ex post facto. The choice of this design was predicated on the premise that the variables under study's (illegal crude bunkering) manifestations had already occurred before the researcher started undertaking this study (Isangedighi, Joshua, Asim & Ekuri, 2004), and as such, could not inherently be manipulated, controlled and engineered (Ndiyo, 2005). Hence, this study took place after the variables (illegal crude oil bunkering) had presumably exerted their effect (insecurity) on the society before the researcher got there. Thus, influences about relations among these variables were made from their occurrences, and not from the direct intervention of the researcher.

Population

The population of this study consisted of the total number of men and officers of Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) of Akwa Ibom State Command. While the total number of sections in the command stood at 6 (six) the total number of officers as obtained from the state commands headquarters was 2173. The Yaro Yamene formular was used to select 337 both junior and senior officers of NSCDC Akwa Ibom Command.

Sampling Technique

In order to draw the sample, stratified random sampling technique was adopted. Using the command strength dispositions of NSCDC, the subjects were stratified into units, assigned numbers and randomly drawn. This yielded a total sample of 336 (three hundred and thirty-six) respondents. The use of random sampling basically, ensured that each officer, at each point of selection had equal and independent chance of being selected. Out of the six (6) units (administration, disaster and crisis, intelligence and investigation, operations, technical service, critical infrastructure and assets) 56 officers were drawn from each section that constitute the command through simple random sampling technique. This was necessary in order to obtain an adequate representative sample of the respondents.

Instrumentation

Officers and men of the various surveillance teams and officers in-charge of illegal oil bunkering unit responded to the questionnaire. The instrument elicited information from the subjects on the variables under study. The questionnaire had two sections viz: A and B. Section A contained demographic information such as sex age, level of educational, duration of service and rank. Section B contained twenty (20) items. Each of the five (5) items per variable measured the role of NSCDC in policing illegal oil bunkering; the strategies used by NSCDC in policing illegal oil bunkering; the effectiveness of NSCDC in policing illegal oil bunkering; and finally highlights the challenges that confront NSCDC in policing illegal oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. All the items in section B were structured using the four-point Likert-type.

Data Collection Procedure

The research instrument (questionnaires) was administered personally by the researcher. A copy of the questionnaire was given to each of the sampled subjects (an officer) where applicable. The subjects were given some time to complete them before the researcher went for collection. Out of the 356 copies of questionnaires administered, 349 were retrieved, giving a return rate of 91.6 percent. The remaining 7 were not recovered. This gave a percentage rate of 8.4. Although not all the questionnaire administered was recovered, the number collected large was enough for generalization.

Methods of Data Analysis

Simple percentage was used to answer the research questions. This assisted to show at a glance the trend of the data and the related variables particularly when presented on tables and figures. The research hypotheses were tested with the use of Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) analytical tool helped to determine relationships between variables of the study.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Respondents' Socio-Demographics

The socio-demographic distribution of the sampled respondents (Table 1) indicates that the total number of respondents is 337, constituting 291(86.4%) male and 46(14.6%) female. Thus, the views being expressed in this study are

representative of both male and female with the male respondents in majority. Result also reveals that the majority of respondents (21.7%) were between ages 8-27years. Similarly, 35.0% of respondents were aged 28-37years, 29.4% of respondents were 38-47years of age, and 13.9% were aged 48years and above. This implies that majority of respondents in this study were considered young, energetic and still in their productive operating age. Given these characteristics, they were expected to be of sound mind and sound body to understand the central theme of this investigation and to make meaningful contribution accordingly.

The educational status of the respondents could be categorized into four groups: these are senior secondary certificate examination (SSCE), ordinary national diploma and National certificate examination (OND/NCE). Consequently, 101(30.0%) of respondents in this study had SSCE. 128(38.0%) had OND/NCE, 90(26.7%) are of the HND and BSC Category, while postgraduate degrees and others are 18(5.3%). The educational distribution of respondents implies that most participants in this study were of average educational status. Years of experience in the maritime business environment, is an important Socio-economic factor that could influence perception of respondents on the subject matter of this study. Therefore, results on Table 1 shows that 154(39.6%) respondents had spent below 5 years in the service, 123(19.7%) had spent over 5- 10years, and 112(28.2%) has high number of years (10years and above) working in the security environment. With the level of security experience, it is optimistic that issues concerning policing of crude oil bunkering in the state would not be strange to the respondents, but would be clearly understood.

Demographic profile		Frequency(N)	Percentage (%)
Sex	Male	291	86.4
	Female	46	13.6
	Total	337	100.0
Age	8-27 years	73	21.7
	28 – 37 years	118	35.0
	38 – 47 years	99	29.4
	48 and Above	47	13.9
	Total	337	100.0
Level of Education	SSCE	101	30.0
	OND/NCE	128	38.0
	HND/B.Sc	90	26.7
	Others	18	5.3
	Total	337	100.0
Level of Experience	Below 5yrs	137	40.6
5-10yrs Above 10yrs		106	31.4
		95	28.0
	Total	337	100.0

 Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (N=337)

Source: Fieldwork (2021)

Role of NSCDC in Policing Crude Oil bunkering: Research Question 1: What are the roles of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State?

Crude oil bunkering has been a serious issue, hence poses a threat to socio-economic development of a region. Due to its importance in the nation's economic reserve, several military and paramilitary agencies have been involved in the past decades in tackling issues of illegal oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. One of the agencies having sole responsibility of policing crude oil bunkering in the State is the NSCDC. It is there necessary for this study to examine the role of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in the state. Table 2 represents role of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in the state.

Table 2: Opinions of respondents on role of NSCDC in policing crude on bulkering							
Parameters		Α	D	SD	% of		
					Agreement		
Policing crude oil bunkering is the sole responsibility	101	128	69	39	68.0%		
of NSCDC in Akwa Ibom State	30.0%	38.0%	20.5%	11.6%			
NSCDC are responsible in arresting oil bunkers in	129	36	71	101	49.0%		
Akwa Ibom State.	38.3%	10.7%	21.1%	30.0%			
NSCDC can also prosecute offenders of crude oil	100	128	71	38	67.7%		
bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	29.7%	38.0%	21.1%	11.3%			
Other security agencies can independently tackle	72	98	130	37	65.0%		
crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	21.4%	29.1%	38.6%	11.0%			
NSCDC transfer offenders of crude oil bunkering to	38	70	100	129	32.1%		
other security agencies to prosecute.	11.3%	20.8%	29.7%	38.3%			
	1 (0.0.0						

Table 2: Opinions of respondents on role of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering

Sources: Fieldwork (2021)

In Table 2, respondents identified the role of NSCDC in policing of crude oil bunkering in the state. 68.0% of the respondents agreed that policing crude oil bunkering is the sole responsibility of NSCDC in Akwa Ibom State; there is no clear-cut agreement among the respondents on whether NSCDC are responsible in arresting oil bunkers in Akwa Ibom State as indicated by 49.0%. 67.7% of the respondents believed that NSCDC can also prosecute offenders of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State While 65.0% of the respondents are of the assertion that other security agencies can independently tackle crude oil bunkering without the involvement of NSCDC in Akwa Ibom State. It is believed that NSCDC does not transfer offenders of crude oil bunkering to other security agencies to prosecute as indicated by 32.1% agreement. Given these findings,

it became crucial to understand the role of NSCDC in policing of crude oil bunkering in the state.

These results are significant to the extent that they came from appropriate sets of respondents, pointing to the authenticity of the role of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa lbom State. Furthermore, a test of the proposition that: There is no significant relationship between safeguarding oil facilities by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State as results on Table 3 would show.

Test of Hypothesis One:

There is no significant relationship between safeguarding oil facilities by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Table 3: Correlation analysis of relationship between safeguarding oil facilities and policing of crude oil
bunkering

		Safeguarding oil facilities	Policing of crude oil bunkering
safeguarding oil	Pearson Correlation	1	.991**
facilities	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	Ν	337	337
policing of crude oil	Pearson Correlation	.991**	1
bunkering	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	Ν	337	337

Sources: Fieldwork (2021); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Given result on Table 3, relationship between safeguarding oil facilities and policing of crude oil bunkering are positively related and significant (r=0.991; p<0.01), given low p-value at 0.05 level of significance leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis and alternate hypothesis being accepted.

Strategies of NSCDC in Policing Crude Oil bunkering:

Research Question 2: What are the strategies used by NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State?

It should be noted that strategies adopted by different paramilitary and security agencies

involve in policing of crude oil bunkering differs. It is therefore imperative to examine the strategies used by NSCDC in tackling this issue in order to provide a framework in which policies and decisions could be taking. These strategies are descriptively presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Opinions of respondents on strategies adopted by NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa
Ibom State

Parameters		Α	D	SD	% of
					Agreement
Frequent patrol has helped to control oil bunkering in	129	100	70	38	68.0%
Akwa Ibom State.	38.3%	29.7%	20.8%	11.3%	
Partnership with other security agencies is adequate in	110	109	28	90	64.9%
controlling oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	32.6%	32.3%	8.3%	26.7%	
Community policing has been effective in controlling oil	119	120	80	18	70.9%
bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	35.3%	35.6%	23.7%	5.3%	
Identification of hotspots has been effective in controlling	121	120	79	17	71.5%
oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.		35.6%	23.4%	5.0%	
The use of informant is adequate in controlling oil		77	27	122	55.7%
bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	32.9%	22.8%	8.0%	36.2%	

Source: Fieldwork (2021)

Table 4 showed that 68.0% of the respondent is of the opinion that frequent patrol has helped to control oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. Partnership with other security agencies is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State had proven effective in curbing the illegal activities in the oil industry as indicated by 64.9% responses. 70.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that Community policing has been effective in controlling oil bunkering. 71.5% showed that identification of hotspots has been effective in controlling oil bunkering, while 55.7% revealed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in a strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly agreed that the use of informant is adequate in controlling oil bunkering in the strongly

Akwa Ibom State. The results presented in Table 4 showed that strategies adopted by the NSCDC have proven effective in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. Inferentially, the results in Table 4 are investigated to examine the effectiveness of partnership as a strategy in policing crude oil bunkering in Table 5.

Test of Hypothesis Two:

There is no significant relationship between security partnership by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Table 5: Correlation analysis of relationship between partnership by NSCDC and policing of crude oil
bunkering

Parameter		Partnership by NSCDC	policing of crude oil bunkering
Partnership by NSCDC	Pearson Correlation	1	.993**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	Ν	337	337
policing of crude oil	Pearson Correlation	.993**	1
bunkering	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	Ν	337	337

Sources: Fieldwork (2021); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 5 showed that relationship between partnership by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering are positively related and significant (r=0.993; p<0.01), given low p-value at 0.05 level of significance leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis and alternate hypothesis being accepted. This implies that partnership among security operatives in the study area could foster and enhance the strategy they engage in combating oil theft and reducing oil bunkering activities in Akwa Ibom State.

Effectiveness of NSCDC in Policing Crude Oil bunkering:

Research Question 3: How effective is NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State?

The Creation of NSCDC in Nigeria was because of demand and inability of other security agencies to sufficiently meet up with growing contemporary issues that requires safeguarding. It is therefore necessary to ascertain if the NSCDC is effective enough in policing of crude oil in Nigeria in which Akwa Ibom is no exception. The variables in Table 6 descriptively presented the effectiveness of NSCDC in Akwa Ibom State according to the opinion of the respondents.

Table 6: Opinions of respondents on effectiveness of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom
State

State							
SA	Α	D	SD	% of			
				Agreement			
109	120	90	18	67.9%			
32.3%	35.6%	26.7%	5.3%				
111	27	122	77	40.9%			
32.9%	8.0%	36.2%	22.8%				
110	90	28	109	59.3%			
32.6%	26.7%	8.3%	32.3%				
129	70	100	38	59.1%			
38.3%	20.8%	29.7%	11.3%				
121	62	18	136	54.3			
35.9%	18.4%	5.3%	40.4%				
	109 32.3% 111 32.9% 110 32.6% 129 38.3% 121	109 120 32.3% 35.6% 111 27 32.9% 8.0% 110 90 32.6% 26.7% 129 70 38.3% 20.8% 121 62	109 120 90 32.3% 35.6% 26.7% 111 27 122 32.9% 8.0% 36.2% 110 90 28 32.6% 26.7% 8.3% 129 70 100 38.3% 20.8% 29.7% 121 62 18	109 120 90 18 32.3% 35.6% 26.7% 5.3% 111 27 122 77 32.9% 8.0% 36.2% 22.8% 110 90 28 109 32.6% 26.7% 8.3% 32.3% 129 70 100 38 38.3% 20.8% 29.7% 11.3% 121 62 18 136			

Sources: Fieldwork (2021)

The assertion is that NSCDC is committed to effective control of oil bunkers in Akwa Ibom as indicated by 67.9%. The position of the respondents is represented by 40.9% that NSCDC have severally engaged recent technology in tackling oil bunkering. 59.3% of the respondents are of the opinion that Officers of NSCDC are adequately motivated to tackle oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. 59.1% responded that Officers of NSCDC are adequately motivated to respond to bunkering issues, while 54.3% strongly agreed that crude oil bunkering has not been adequately tackled due to poor operation interventions. From the responses in Table 6, it could be inferred that the only area that needs urgent intervention is in the area lack of adequate technology in policing of crude oil bunkering. If issues can be adequately tackled and provided, it will go a long way in effective policing of crude oil facilities in the state. The statistical significance and result NSCDC activities are presented in Table 7.

Test of Hypothesis Three:

NSCDC activities have not been effective in policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Ta	ole 7: Correlation anal	ysis of relationshi	p betweer	ı NSCDC	activities a	nd policing	g of crude oil	bunkering

		NSCDC Activities	policing of crude oil bunkering
NSCDC Activities	Pearson Correlation	1	.994**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	Ν	337	337
policing of crude oil bunkering	Pearson Correlation	.994**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	Ν	337	337

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 7 showed that relationship between NSCDC activities and policing of crude oil bunkering are positively related and significant (r=0.994; p<0.01), given low p-value at 0.05 level of significance leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis and alternate hypothesis being accepted. Though the provision of advance technology in NSCDC has been an issue, the effectiveness of NSCDC activities in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State is commendable.

Challenges of NSCDC in Policing Crude Oil bunkering:

Research Question 4: What are the challenges the NSCDC face in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State?

In order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization, institution and so on, it is imperative to assess the challenges confronting such organization. Security agency such as NSCDC is not left out in this notion due to its importance in the policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State and Nigeria at large. Table 8 descriptively assesses challenges confronting the effectiveness of policing

crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Table 8: Opinions of respondents on challenges hindering effectiveness of NSCDC in policing crude oil					
bunkering in Akwa Ibom State					

Parameters	SA	Α	D	SD	% of
					Agreement
Poor working condition hinders the policing of crude oil	100	128	77	32	67.7%
bunkering in Akwa Ibom State	29.7%	38.0%	22.8%	9.5%	
Lack of operational facilities can hinder the policing of	121	83	112	21	60.5%
crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State	35.9%	24.6%	33.2%	6.2%	
Lack of synergy with other security operatives hinders	73	118	99	47	56.7%
the policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	21.7%	35.0%	29.4%	13.9%	
Unequal pay among security agencies can hinder the	118	80	112	27	58.7%
policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	35.0%	23.7%	33.2%	8.0%	
Lack of training and skills hinders the policing of crude	121	109	86	21	68.2%
oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.	35.9%	32.3%	25.5%	6.2%	

Sources: Fieldwork (2021)

Results in Table 8 showed that 67.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that poor working condition hinders the policing of crude oil bunkering, 60.5% of the respondents agreed that lack of operational facilities can hinder the policing of crude oil bunkering, 56.7% believes that lack of synergy with other security operatives hinders the policing of crude oil bunkering, Unequal pay among security agencies can hinder the policing of crude oil bunkering the policing of crude oil bunkering state as represented by 58.7%, while 68.2% responded to the item on Table 8 that lack of training and skills hinders the policing of crude oil bunkering in the State. This high level of challenges confronting NSCDC as shown by the

results in Table 4.8 is a serious issue that needs to be address if we want to see and sustain effective policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. Due to the observed challenges, it therefore becomes necessary to statistically investigate if funding of NSCDC can contribute to effective policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. This issue is presented in Table 9.

Test of Hypothesis Four:

There is no significant relationship between funding of NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Table 9: Correlation analysis of relationship between funding of NSCDC and policing of crude oil
hunkering

		Funding of NSCDC	policing of crude oil bunkering			
Funding of NSCDC	Pearson Correlation	1	.993**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000			
	Ν	337	337			
policing of crude oil bunkering	Pearson Correlation	.993**	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000				
	Ν	337	337			

Sources: Fieldwork (2021); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 9 showed that the relationship between funding of NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering are positively related and significant (r=0.994; p<0.01), given low p-value at 0.05 level of significance leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis and alternate hypothesis being accepted. This implies that funding of NSCDC will increase their effectiveness in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The first objective was to find out the role that NSCDC play in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. The result from the analysis showed that there was a significant relationship between safeguarding oil facilities by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. This finding corroborated with the progress reports of NSCDC (2012) and Wilson (2014). Given these findings, it became crucial to understand the role of NSCDC in policing of crude oil bunkering in the state. This is due to the fact that the sole responsibility of its establishment was for policing oil and gas and other properties in the country.

The second objective was to examine the strategies used by NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. It should be noted

that strategies adopted by different paramilitary and security agencies involve in policing of crude oil bunkering differs. Some agencies still choose to work in isolation due to some reasons best known to them. In the case of NSCDC, one of the strategies is partnership with other security agencies through Joint Task Force and on. It therefore becomes necessary to examine how the strategies adopted have helped in curbing crude oil menace in the state. The result from the analysis showed that relationship between partnership by NSCDC and policing of crude oil bunkering are positively related and significant. As reported by Tomas (2010), Ogodo (2012), and Uche (2013), Example of such importance of partnership is recorded in Joint Task Force Progress in Akwa Ibom State, which does not deviate from the finding of the study. It can be inferred from the findings that effectiveness of partnership cannot be relegated to the background in the fight of crime; not only by the NSCDC, but by other security agencies.

In the same vein, it becomes pertinent to investigate the effectiveness of NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in the state in which third objective has been able to address. Findings showed that NSCDC activities have been effective in policing of crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. But despite its effectiveness in the policing activities, it is always believed that there are areas that can be improved upon to achieve sustainability. From the discussion of the earlier statement, such area that is in need of urgent attention is in shortage and engagement of modern technology which is an important organ that should not be ignore if the issue of development in any nation is taken seriously.

There are several challenges confronting the effectiveness of security agencies in Nigeria. One of the major noticeable challenges is the issues of lack of funding, in which NSCDC is not exception as revealed by findings from this study. To highlight the challenges that confronts the NSCDC in policing crude oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State. The relationship between funding and policing of crude oil bunkering was statistically investigated. The result showed that there was a significant relationship between funding of NSCDC and policing o crude oil bunkering in the state. This implies that if funding of NSCDC increases, effectiveness of policing of crude oil bunkering will increase given strong positive correlation value of 0.994.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing findings, we reached the conclusions that: the role of men and officers of the NSCDC in carryout security engagements to control oil theft and bunkering activities in Akwa Ibom State is enormous; safe guiding oil facilities through surveillance are a useful strategy to checkmate oil theft and bunkering activities in Akwa Ibom State; partnership through collaboration among security operatives has a huge role to play in the fight against oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State; and finally, the absence of necessary equipment and facilities required to enhance security operatives engagement has hindered the effective policing of oil bunkering in Akwa Ibom State.

Given the conclusions reached, the following recommendations are put forward:

- 1. The provision of engagement requirements (equipment and facilities) can go a long way to enhance the operations of NSCDC, especially in the aspects of patrol, communication and surveillance.
- 2. Behaviour change communication (BCC) strategy is necessary to re-orient and reconscientize security operatives for the need for synergy to ensure security effectiveness on oil bunkering activities in Akwa Ibom State.
- 3. There is need for NSCDC to increase patrol on oil facilities through the provision armed security and surveillance. This will add to increase security presence in oil facility area, thereby keeping the area safe and secured.
- 4. For further study, other researchers could enquire into a geo-spatial comparison of bunkering activities in the entire Niger Delta region.

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