



Public Sector Governance and Service Delivery in Foreign Ministries: An Assessment of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Article History

Received: 02.09.2024

Accepted: 07.10.2024

Published: 11.10.2024

Abstract: The paper presents findings of a study carried out to examine the effects of public sector governance on service delivery in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-MoFA, Uganda. The primary objective of the study were to establish how public accountability and transparency mechanisms influence service delivery in Foreign Service. A cross-sectional research design, adopting both qualitative and quantitative approaches of data collection and analysis was used. The findings revealed that public accountability and transparency are positively correlated with service delivery in the Foreign Service. The other finding is that the social and financial accountability systems in MoFA are weak. The paper concludes that there is urgent need to improve effective and sustainable service delivery in the Foreign Service. Accordingly, the paper recommends that MoFA should ensure that every Foreign Service officer is fully accountable for their actions at work; management should be just in all its actions regarding its officers; and MoFA should modernize its communication system. The paper identifies some areas of future investigation.

Keywords: Public Sector Governance; Service Delivery; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda.

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Public Sector Governance-PSG refers to relationships involving the organizations and institutions of the state, how the state interacts with society to provide services, how the state makes itself accountable and transparent to society (Turner, 2013). Service delivery refers to a relationship between policy makers, service providers, and consumers of those services, and encompasses both services and their supporting systems (Ministry of Local Government, 2013) in as far as they are effective and sustainable. Service delivery at Ministry of Foreign Affairs –MoFA has been associated with challenges of transparency and accountability. The research being presented was done to analyse this situation.

PSG in contemporary Uganda is defined by elective democracy, decentralization, liberalization and privatization all of which began taking root in the 1990s (Batley, 2006)). To fit in with the new paradigm, MoFA has reviewed its structure, improved its information management systems, carried out mission inspections and tried to strengthen its accountability and transparency mechanisms in order to achieve effectiveness and sustainability in its service delivery (Ministerial of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This paper presents findings from a study carried out in 2016 to investigate the relationships between PSG and service delivery in MoFA.

PSG is about contracting out, franchising and introducing new forms of regulation in the public

Citation: Michael Galukande Kiganda & Joshua Kivuna (2024). Public Sector Governance and Service Delivery in Foreign Ministries: An Assessment of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Glob Acad J Linguist Lit*; Vol-6, Iss-5 pp-175-186.

sector in forms commonly referred to as the new public management (Stoker, 1998). PSG is more than a new set of managerial tools and an appropriation of democratic vocabulary (Bang & Esmark, 2009). It also focuses on achieving greater efficiency in the production of public services by creating empowerment, individual freedom, creativity and self-governance framed by participation, transparency and accountability. Good governance relies on instruments of governance that nurture and strategically utilize the self-governing potential of civil society under the strategic supervision of public authorities, seen in such diverse areas as employment policy, foreign policy, public service policy, employment policy, educational policy, accounting practices etc (Bang & Esmark, 2007).

Foreign public policy implementation in the 21st Century often involves a complex web or delivery network that minimizes traditional direct service methods employed by governmental entities (Blair, 2000). PSG advocates for minimal state (Bowornwathana, 1997) and lesser public bureaucracies with a smaller government that handles fewer issues; having a global vision and flexibility; accountable and (Borelli & Kendall 2004). In short, PSG in Foreign Service provides a framework of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors become blurred; governing mechanisms that do not rest on authority and sanctions of government; creation of a structure resulting from interaction of a multiplicity of governing institutions and other actors influencing (Kooiman & Vliet, 1993; Bevir, 2011; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1997; Gerry 1998).

The mandate of MoFA is to promote and protect Uganda's interests abroad. The objectives are; to promote regional /international peace and security, promote Uganda's exports, inward foreign direct investment, tourism and technology transfer, mobilize as well as strengthen institutional capacity of MoFA and affiliated institutions to deliver a result-oriented foreign policy (MPS 2015/16). This mandate is in line with the interventions of public sector governance. Indeed MoFA has coordinated Uganda's peace and security efforts which resulted into Uganda contributing troops for peace and security missions in Somalia (AMISOM), troops in Central African Republic and mediating for peace in Burundi. Regarding institutional capacity building, the Ministry has secured various opportunities for Ugandans to train in Australia, China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, Pakistan and Thailand (MoFA, 2015/16).

In spite of the efforts in PSG interventions, MoFA has on several occasions failed to realize its

aforementioned objectives. Indicators of failed efforts are traced in the absence of a foreign policy for the country, poor management systems and practices at Uganda's missions abroad, imprudent lack of a comprehensive policy and legal framework to handle the welfare of Foreign Service Officers - FSOs, failure to mobilize Uganda's diaspora for development, failure to transmit *Mission Charters* and to induct FSOs about the values of the charters (MPS 2015/16). It is against this background that the study assessed how Public Sector Governance has affected service delivery at MoFA.

Conceptualisation

The conceptual background to PSG is traced in the underpinnings of good governance and New Public Management- NPM. As an approach to public management, NPM emerged in the 1980s as an alternative to traditional public administration which had failed to deliver the public good because it proved to be ineffective, sluggish and costly (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014). Prior to the emergence of NPM paradigm, public administration was seen as the most rational avenue for managing the affairs of the public. However, Osborne and Gambler (1992) opine that there was a need to reinvent government and harness the entrepreneurial spirit to transform the public sector and later "banish the bureaucracy". This pointed clearly to the need to restructure government bureaucracy to promote productivity, competitiveness, and efficiency and effectiveness. One of the key features of NPM, was the introduction of governance reforms; by moving away from traditional government structures to governance systems. Governance concepts mark a shift away from state control and state interventionist models of government to a minimalist state that is only concerned with provision of basic goods and services such as foreign policy, defence, education and health (Mothusi & Dipholo, 2008). The broad foundation of PSG includes both political and economic pillars. The political pillars are built on the principles of: representative and accountable governments; pluralism, civil society, and freedom of speech and expression; good institutions with well-known rules of governing actions; rule of law and a sound legal system; as well as high degrees of transparency and accountability in public and corporate processes (Downer, 2000). On the economic pillar, good governance is guided by the principles of: a dynamic private sector, supportive social policies aimed at eradicating poverty; public investment in education and training; and effective and competitive private sector (Downer, 2000).

In this study PSG therefore, was conceptualised around two variables of *Accountability and Transparency*. Both accountability and transparency are inseparable from NPM and

good governance. The two were investigated as the independent variables. Since the overall objectives of public sector governance are to enhance service delivery in the public sector, this study investigated service delivery in terms of *Effectiveness and Sustainability*. These constituted the dependent variable under investigation. This study was further conceptualised on the theoretical belief that the introduction of public sector governance was responsible for the service delivery situation in MoFA.

Public management in Uganda has witnessed many changes since the 1980s and in particular, the coming of the National Resistance Movement – NRM government. In the inaugural speech after taking over power, President Yoweri Museveni referred to it as “...a fundamental change”. Since then, several political, administrative and technical interventions have been designed to entrench public sector governance as a public management intervention for good governance. These interventions have resulted into a number of public sector reforms. The public sector reforms were propelled by of factors that included governance failures, endemic corruption, nepotism, and bureaucratic delays. The World Bank, through its Structural Adjustment Programmes -SAPs recommended four interventions in public sector governance: a) Public sector management reforms emphasizing the need for effective financial and human resource management through improved budgeting, accounting and reporting and identifying and rectifying inefficiency particularly in public enterprises (through restructuring); b) Accountability in public services, including effective accounting, auditing, and decentralization and generally making public officials responsible for their actions and responsive to consumers; c) A predictable legal framework with rules known and a reliable and independent judiciary and law enforcement mechanisms and d) Availability of information and transparency in order to enhance policy analysis, promote public debate and reduce the risk of corruption (World Bank, 2002).

PSG in MoFA emphasizes ameliorating public sector management systems that enhance efficiency, effectiveness, productivity and competitiveness in service delivery (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014).

The mandate of MoFA is to promote and protect Uganda’s interests abroad. The objectives are to promote regional /international peace and security, promote Uganda’s exports, increase foreign direct investment, tourism and technology transfer, mobilize, and strengthening institutional capacity of MoFA and affiliated institutions to deliver a result oriented foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Policy 2015). This mandate is in line with the interventions

of public sector governance. MoFA has coordinated Uganda’s peace and security efforts which resulted into Uganda contributing troops for peace and security missions in Somalia (AMISOM), troops in Central African Republic and mediating for peace in Burundi. For institutional capacity building the Ministry has secured various opportunities for Ugandans to train in South Africa, Australia, China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, Pakistan and Thailand (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

Statement of the Problem:

MoFA has both development plans and Sector Investment Plans – SIPs. The SIPs guide and map out strategies for implementation of priority intervention activities and projects. They aim at efficient allocation of resources which are intended to lead to the attainment of MoFA’s objectives hence resulting in improved quality of service delivery (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Both the development plans and SIPs are made with the aim of enhancing public sector governance at MoFA. Other programmes of enhancing public sector governance include: increasing responsiveness in the MoFA and missions abroad by establishing *Clients Charters*; involvement of the private sector in MoFA activities especially through procurement and contracting processes; introducing e-governance in the securing of visas; restructuring of staff and missions abroad, and establishing new human resource reward systems.

In spite of the PSG interventions, MoFA has on several occasions failed to realize its aforementioned objectives. Indicators of failed efforts are found in the un coordinated foreign policy for the country, poor public management systems and practices at Uganda’s missions abroad, imprudent lack of a comprehensive policy and legal framework to handle the welfare of Foreign Service Officers -FSOs, failure to mobilize Uganda’s diaspora for development, failure to transmit *Mission Charters* and to induct FSOs about the values of these charters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2015). It is against such a background that the study undertook an investigation to assess how public sector governance has affected service delivery at MoFA.

There has not been a MoFA sanctioned study to investigate how the introduction of public sector governance has affected service delivery. As such, this study aimed to generate workable policy interventions and to avert possible negative consequences the country would suffer if public sector governance fails to deliver expected public services.

As far as Public Sector Governance is concerned, the study was limited to the elements of accountability and transparency. For the variable of service delivery, the study was limited to the dimensions of effectiveness and sustainability in the period between 2008- 2015, the period when the Auditor General's 2008 Report raised queries of service delivery at MoFA.

Related Literature

This study was under pinned on the Public Choice Theory as advanced by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). This theory employs economics methods in analysing government practices. This theory is premised on beliefs that people are always driven by self-interests which affect the decisions taken by public officials in government (Butler, 2012). The theory further suggests that although it is important to make decisions in the general interests of the public, this is sometimes difficult because in the political sphere, there are many interest groups that want to further their own interests. Even the behaviours of public sector bureaucrats who are at the heart of public choice are sometimes affected by the quest for private benefits. While bureaucrats are supposed to work in the public interest, putting into practice policies of government as efficiently and effectively as possible, they sometimes work in their own self-interest utility maximizing utility (Muller, 2009). Bureaucrats are motivated by factors as salary, prerequisites of office, power, patronage, big budgets and ease of managing their bureaus. Public choice theory concludes, that there is no single "public choice" rather different people have different values and different interests (Rooney, 2008).

Public choice theory applies economic analysis (game theory and decision theory) to the political process to identify government inefficiencies (Becker, 2008). It also looks at limitations in information on the part of all actors in the political process which also result in inefficiencies. Specifically, the theory suggests that the presence of self-interests in public officials is responsible for the corruption in the public sector. Public corruption has the long term impact of causing failing service delivery in the public sector. Corruption fails public sector service delivery by breeding institutional deficiencies in transparency and accountability. Corruption thrives in environments of low levels of transparency and accountability. The relationship therefore, among transparency, accountability and service delivery is triangular.

It is known that accountability and transparency initiatives expose corruption (Amerada, 2010). Transparency exposes corruption by pointing out discrepancies in public accounts and catalysing more formal accountability mechanisms

such as audits and investigations so long as information made public is used by the responsible public accountability institutions. However, as Fox, (2007) indicated, transparency will not always lead to accountability until pressure is exerted on public authorities to respond and sanction the culprits. Nonetheless, certain forms of transparency and accountability if accompanied by punitive measures are likely to force public official to abandon the vice.

Secondly, transparency and accountability lead to increased responsiveness on the part of providers; improved access and quality of services; and consequently better developmental outcomes (Amerada, 2010) so long as the exposure of poor performance will have consequences. . This is true when failures in service delivery therefore is due to poor motivation on the part of public officials and not lack of resources or capacities as the existence of accountability and transparency mechanisms.

This study was carried out on the theoretical framework of the public choice theory and analysed the relationship between public sector governance in term of accountability and transparency which influences the achievement of effectiveness and sustainability in service delivery. The presumption of this study was that although public sector governance had good intentions on enhancing public sector performance and responsiveness, it may, at certain absurd moments, be influenced by the search for private benefits. The theoretical question in this study was whether it's the search for self-interests that has affected public sector governance in MoFA.

Public Accountability and Service Delivery

There may not be one universal definition of accountability. Several scholars and institutions have defined accountability in their own forms. However, the clearest and most basic exposition of the concept of accountability is provided by Schedler, (1999) who indicated that public accountability comprises of a relationship between the power holder (account-provider) and delegator (account-demander). Accountability ideally involves both answerability – the responsibility of duty-bearers to provide information and justification about their actions – and enforceability– the possibility of penalties or consequences for failing to answer accountability claims (Goetz & Jenkins, 2005). Schedler puts four elements to accountability—setting standards, getting information about actions, making judgments about appropriateness and sanctioning unsatisfactory performance. Service delivery on the other hand involves things provided by governments for and to citizens (Elgeman Jean, 2007). These may be directly benefiting the individual, or indirectly affecting the individual through operation of laws, policies and regulations. In similar ways, services

may be for individuals or for organisations or both. In any case, governments facilitate individuals and organisations to do things that they would have not ordinarily been able to do for themselves or that make it easier for them to do things.

Improving the quality public services delivery in Africa is a challenging governance policy issue. While African governments have recognised the importance of delivering quality services as critical in the overall development agenda, many still find it difficult to generate and sustain a positive correlation between the huge amounts of funds budgeted and spent on service delivery and the outcomes from such expenditures (Mwanji, 2013). Evidence from several studies carried out throughout Africa suggests that service delivery outcomes can be improved without additional resources if there were improvements in the utilizations of resources—resource leakages are minimized. African governments have to work to strengthen the link between resource and service delivery outcomes and get value for the money, improving governance across the entire service delivery chain is necessary by enhancing accountability in the public sector. Poor service delivery in Africa therefore is not just a link between needs and public resources allocated to them, but essentially as a result of poor accountability frameworks (World Bank, 2004).

To enhance the public accountability framework, governments should establish and sustain a well-functioning accountability framework. This can be achieved by putting in place a “Voice” relationship where users of public services (clients) can effectively give feed back to the policy makers. This accountability arrangement makes policymakers accountable to the clients and thus clients’ concerns and views should be heard and appropriately acted upon by the policymakers.

The other way to build a strong accountability framework is to establish agreements between policy makers and service providers such that each party knows what it is expected of. The service providers are usually expected to deliver quality goods and services while the policy makers are expected to put conducive policies frameworks, guidelines and finances to enable service providers execute their mandates. In such an arrangement, accountability happens when policymakers are in position to monitor the performance of the providers. Lastly, service providers should be accountable to citizens and this is referred to as client power. Client power implies that the clients can directly hold the providers accountable (Kimenyi, 2012).

Accountability in the public sector is enforced through establishment of a series of

accountability legal and institutional regimes. These have been dominated by social accountability interventions that function alongside the legal and institutional accountability framework. At the bottom level, some countries have encouraged public information dissemination. In Uganda for example, there is *The Access to Information Act* (GOU 2005). The act makes it easier to access some public information. A study carried out to examine the impact of community based information on management of community schools in three states in India, found this approach effective (Pandey *et al.*, 2009). Public Expenditure Tracking Systems –PETS are another instruments of social accountability used to follow up remittance of public funds to localities. The study carried out by Reinikka and Svenssons, (2005) and many PETS have found out that rarely do the remitted funds reach the local beneficiaries. Other governments have established public complaints mechanisms as interventions to enhance accountability. In Uganda, for example, the enactment of *The Whistle Blowers’ Act* (GOU 2010) was a move in that direction. Other governments have set up hotlines, citizens’ charters and complaints management systems to enhance national complaints institutions. Citizens Report Cards -SRC are another tool of social accountability. These are consumer satisfaction surveys on the quality of public services especially those contracted out to service providers and in Bangalore where they were first carried out in 2004, SRCs had a positive impact on the quality of public services. The other instruments of social accountability are the Community Score Cards-CSC. These are a combination of CRC, Community Monitoring-CM and Social Audits –SA. The CSCs are popular for holding community meetings in which stakeholders (such as civil servants, service providers, politicians e.t.c.) are involved. Community Monitoring –CM is another tool of social accountability. In Uganda it is commonly used by *Uganda Debt Network*- a local NGO, as a continuous monitoring process of proper utilisation of public funds, especially expenditures out of the public debt. Lastly, there are also public hearings and social audits as tools of social accountability. In Uganda, such hearings are popularly known as “*Barazas*” and public officials are paraded before local communities to give answer to community issues especially these related to accountability.

In Uganda, there are several accountability regimes. At MoFA, there is an internal accountability framework where the permanent secretary is the accounting officer and heads of departments control the departmental votes. At the missions, an officer, other than the head of mission, is appointed by the permanent secretary/ secretary to the treasury as the mission accounting officer with recommendation from the permanent secretary MoFA. The accounting

officer at the mission can be junior staff just accredited to the mission. This has often resulted into management and accountability issues when senior diplomats fail to agree with the appointed accounting officers. Besides the internal financial accountability framework, MoFA is subjected to national accountability framework that includes: the office of the Inspector General of Government-IGG, the Accountant General- AG, the Auditor General- AG, internal and external auditors, the police, anti-corruption court, and parliamentary public accounts committee.

There are several challenges to establishment of effective accountability regimes. Such challenges have been ably highlighted by (OECD, 2016). First of all, the diverse intergovernmental systems create many accountability centres and raise several questions of where to account. Secondly, the national strategic goals can be numerous, such that some goals may not relate to the demand for increased accountability through improved service delivery. Similarly, many government programmes that would ordinarily work together to enhance accountability, end up operating independently and concentrate on individual departmental missions and goals. Domestic politics also plays an important card in building national accountability frameworks by either encouraging or discouraging its growth depending on political demands. In an unprecedented way, donor agencies also influence the development of national accountability frameworks either by stereo typing it or by keeping a deaf ear to accountability issues so long as they do not interfere with their respective missions. Lastly, service delivery is inherently embedded in national contexts such that how governments use powers – depends on the locus of local political power – may, for example, lead to uneven provision of services or to over- or under-taxing of certain constituents, creating behavioural distortions and inequities.

PSG provides a framework for improving accountability and stewardship as it relates to resources. Today, employees, investors and employers are concerned with institutions holding the balance between the economic and social goals, insisting on institutions requiring fairness and transparency (Nagel, 1998). Good PSG should be of value to the institutions by ensuring stakeholders' confidence, continuous growth/development and profits.

PSG specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the institution such as the board managers, stakeholders and spells out the rules and the procedures for making decisions as corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which public

sector's objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring service delivery (OECD, 2004).

Transparency and Service Delivery

The term transparency has become very popular in recent governance studies. McGee and Gaventa (2011) defined transparency as a key feature of good governance, and an essential prerequisite for accountability between states and citizens. Transparency in public governance implies 'an openness of the governance system through clear processes and procedures and easy access to public information for citizens [stimulating] ethical awareness in public service through information sharing, which ultimately ensures accountability for the performance of the individuals and organisations handling resources or holding public office' (Kim *et al.*, 2005). Transparency International, defines transparency as a 'characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and individuals of being open in the clear disclosure of information rules, plans, processes and actions' (Transparency International, 2009).

Transparency as a pillar of good governance enables citizens access vital information needed to engage government. The relationship between transparency and accountability is direct. Transparency in public transactions enhances accountability and leads to improvement in service delivery. Information accessibility therefore affects accountability and improves the quality of governance (Bellver & Kaufmann 2005). Recent innovations in citizens' legal right to information and participatory budgeting and community development processes have tested the extent to which 'transparency on decisions is hand in hand with transparency on consequences' (Prat, 2005). The relationship of transparency to accountability is necessary but alone not sufficient for service delivery and good governance (McGee & Gaventa, 2010). Besides this instrumental value, transparency often has an inherent value.

In countries like Uganda, there is a marked lack of information regarding government programs that hamper citizens' capacity to monitor the effective use of national resources to sustain community investments, and to react against acts of corruption in society. The information that comes out of Government sectors is one sided and not easily corroborated due to lack of openness regarding the sources of information. *The Access to Information Act (GOU 2005)* should mean more than mere regulation of how and what information will be made accessible otherwise the right to access is still illusory, especially in the sensitive area of defence expenditure (Cairnes, 2003).

Regarding appointments, there needs to be a formal and transparent process to ensure that assumption of public office is made in accordance with specified criteria of competence and based on merit and the individual’s ability to carry out a defined role within the organization (Cairnes, 2003). There is need for selective hiring of qualified staff. Successful recruitment and retention of staff is tied to empowerment of staff that must be treated as full partners in a given Public Institution operation and given opportunities for advancement (Brown & Duguid, 2003).

To improve efficiency in service delivery, public sector Public Institutions must build the capacity to attract and employ an adequate number of high-quality staff (Argote & Ingram, 2000). A key to service delivery is having employees that can adapt correctly to circumstances that are constantly changing.

METHODOLOGY

This study used a cross-sectional research design, adopting both qualitative and quantitative approaches to measure a range of variables at a particular point of time. This enables the researchers to achieve a higher degree of validity and reliability, while allowing concrete and realistic descriptions of the findings (Amin, 2005; Sekaran, 2004). The study targeted 88 staff members at MoFA and at missions abroad who included top management, administrators, senior managers, Foreign Service Officers and other administrative staff. Purposive and simple random sampling techniques were used to select the respondents. Purposive sampling technique was used to select a small sample from top management. This enabled the researchers to acquire an in-depth understanding of the problem and also to gain richer, useful and focused information (Gay, 1996; Oso & Onen; 2008). The study used interview guides, researcher-administered questionnaires, and documentary review on the sample at the same time to neutralizing any inherent bias (Amin, 2005). The study population, sample size selection, technique and instruments are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1: Study population, Sample size, techniques and data collection instruments

Category of respondent	Study Population	Sample size	Sampling Technique	Data Collection method
Top Management	3	3	Purposive sampling	Interview
Administration	10	10	Purposive sampling	Interview
Senior Management	15	14	Simple Random Sampling	Questionnaire
Foreign Service Officers	40	36	Simple Random Sampling	Questionnaire
Administrative Staff	20	19	Simple Random Sampling	Questionnaire
Total	88	82		

Source: Researchers; 2024

Validity of the instruments was tested using the Content Validity Index while reliability of quantitative data, Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient for Likert-type scales test was performed. For qualitative data analysis, thematic analysis was used while for quantitative data, Spearman’s correlation analysis Spearman was used to test the hypothesis in order to establish the relationship between public sector governance and service delivery.

In view of the above, 2 hypotheses were derived:

Hypothesis 1: Accountability positively influences Service delivery by MoFA of Uganda.

Hypothesis 2: Transparency positively influences Service delivery by MoFA of Uganda.

These hypotheses formed the basis for the research design and methodology. To conform to the acceptable standards of social and professional behaviour of research, the study was implemented under strict ethical considerations.

Findings of the Study

Preliminary findings showed that the majority of respondents had sufficient experience in the MoFA and were familiar with the study subject. These were specific findings pertaining to the study objectives which are discussed specifically as hereunder:

Accountability and Service delivery

Findings revealed that there was a moderately positive statistical significance relationship between accountability and service delivery in MoFA. Specifically, 72.4% agreed that accountability by MoFA staff had led to improved service delivery. In general changes, like the new management style, new method of performance appraisal for staff, new methods of accountability for funds both at Headquarters and the Missions abroad led to improved service delivery. At the same time, 70.7% of the respondents agreed that there was clear laid down rules and procedures for accountability for ones actions as one carries out their specified work,

although a substantial number of 25.9% disagreed. The existence of laid down standing orders which were constantly reminded to officers, as well as regular circular standing instructions sent out from time to time makes the majority believe that there are laid down rules and procedures for accountability for ones actions.

On the contrary, findings also revealed that there are no clear cut consequences for officers who do not deliver outputs according to annual budgets and plans. In the same way, there were no clear and known rewards for officer who excel in output hence contributing to service delivery. Respondents believed that the process of staff deployment, transfers and postings were not just. The other finding was that MoFA lacks appropriate communication methods to relay information in a timely manner to its staff both at Headquarters and the Missions abroad.

As to whether MoFA appropriately monitors both Headquarters and Missions abroad, 65.5% of the respondents agreed that Ministry’s management appropriately monitors both Headquarters and Missions abroad for service delivery, although a substantial number of 29.3% disagreed. The Ministry Headquarters receives monthly, quarterly, bi-annual

and yearly reports from Missions abroad leading to appropriate monitoring of these Missions as well as the Headquarter Departments. Some Missions however do not adhere to this rule; this leads to some departments oversee these Missions, to disagree with the propositions that there is appropriate monitoring of both Headquarters and Missions for Service delivery.

The study however showed mixed reactions on the existence of set ways and mechanisms to measure the output of every officer’s output and give feedback. On this issue only 46.5% agreed while 45.8% disagreed and the other were not sure. This was because it was reported that although the staff performance appraisal system was in place, it was not adhered to when considering promotions and that there were no clear consequences to officers who did not deliver their outputs.

A correlation analysis tested at 95% level of significance (two-tailed) using Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation coefficient was conducted to establish the degree and direction of the relationship between public accountability mechanisms and service delivery at MoFA and the results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Correlation coefficients for public accountability mechanisms and service delivery at MoFA

Variables		Accountability	Service delivery
Accountability	Pearson Correlation	1	.675*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	58	58
Service delivery	Pearson Correlation	.675*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	58	58

Source: Researchers, 2024

NB: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2 shows that there is a moderate positive relationship between accountability and service delivery at MoFA, ($r= 0.675$; $p=0.000$; $n=58$). This relationship is statistically significant at 95% confidence level since p-value significance is less than the conventional value of 0.050 at 0.000. This implied that improvements in accountability are positively and significantly associated with improvements in service delivery. Conversely, declines in

accountability shall be associated with declines in service delivery.

In order to establish the extent to which accountability influenced service delivery. Regression analysis was conducted with the coefficient of determination – R Square and the results are illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Model summary of the regression analysis of accountability and service delivery at MoFA

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.675 ^a	.456	.446	.70828

a. Predictors: (Constant), Accountability

Source: Researchers, 2024

Table 3 shows that the coefficient of determination (the adjusted R Square) as 0.446 literally implying that accountability accounts for up-

to 44.6% of the observed variation in service delivery and other external factors account for the greater percentage variance in service delivery.

In order to calculate the overall significance of the model, the researchers further generated an

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and the results are illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	23.546	1	23.546	46.935	.000 ^b
	Residual	28.093	56	.502		
	Total	51.639	57			
a. Dependent Variable: Service delivery						
b. Predictors: (Constant), Accountability						

Source: Researchers, 2024

The conventional approach to determining the significance of the regression model of considering the p value of less than or equal to 0.05, was used. Accordingly, since the p-value was 0.000 and was less than the conventional p-value of 0.050, it was concluded that the regression model was statistically significant (F= 46935; df =1; p<0.05 (= 0.000). This further proved that accountability bears a significant influence on service delivery: implying that improving accountability statistically leads to improvements in service delivery.

The overall findings based on the correlation analysis proved that the stated hypothesis that the public accountability mechanisms have an influence on service delivery were accepted. Indeed public accountability bears a moderate positive statistically significant relationship with service delivery.

Transparency and Service Delivery

Fourteen statements of questions were analysed in order to establish whether transparency bears a significant effect on service delivery at MoFA.

As to whether staff believed that there was transparency in the foreign-service, 65% of the respondents were in agreement and a substantial 29% were in disagreement. With a corresponding 58.6% of the respondents in agreement that MoFA views the external environment as the rest of the ministry. When the respondents were further examined on the conduct of regular meetings, 81.1% disagreed that there were no regular meetings to brief staff in MoFA although 55.25 of the staff agreed that some meetings indeed take place between top

and senior management. Despite this scenario, 55.2% of the respondents were in agreement that there are some communication mechanisms in place.

On the existence of standards of conduct across MoFA, 50.0% of the respondents were in disagreement although a substantial 46.5% were in agreement. Surprisingly, 65% believed that there were systems in place to ensure access to official information and 50% believed that this information was available at any point in time. In the same direction, 53.5% were in agreement that there exists modern communication mechanisms to relay information across the MoFA although 58.7% believed that MoFA was not economical in communicating with the general public.

Overall, 65.5% believed that management does not penalise staff who violate transparency norms though contradictorily, 84% believed that supervisors were transparent in conduct of their duties. Although an astonishing 46.6% believed that MoFA staff were not transparent in dealing wit outside clients.

To establish the overall influence of transparency on service delivery at MoFA, and based on the study hypothesis that transparency has a significant effect on service delivery, a correlation analysis was carried out. The hypothesis was tested at 95% level of significance (two-tailed) using Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient to measure both the degree and direction of relationship between transparency at MoFA and service delivery. Results of the analysis are illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: correlation coefficients for transparent and service delivery

Variables		Transparency	Service delivery
Transparency	Pearson Correlation	1	.671*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	58	58
Service delivery	Pearson Correlation	.671*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	58	58

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Researchers, 2024

Table 5 shows a moderate positive relationship between transparency and service delivery, ($r= 0.671$; $p=0.000$; $n= 58$). This relationship is statistically significant at 95% confidence level since the p-value significance is less than 0.050 ($=0.000$), this implies that improvements in transparency are associated with improvements in service delivery and conversely, decline in

transparency shall be associated to decline in service delivery.

Regression analysis was further conducted to establish the extent to which transparency affected service delivery. The conventional variance (R Square) was used and results are illustrated in Table6.

Table 6: Regression analysis of transparency and service delivery

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.671 ^a	.450	.440	.71236

a. Predictors: (Constant), Transparency

Source: Researchers, 2024

Table 6 shows the coefficient of determination (Adjusted r square) as 0.440, implying that transparency accounts for up-to 44% of the variance in service delivery. This further implies that

the other factors outside transparency contribute a bigger percentage to service delivery.

In order to pass the overall significance of the model, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used and the results are illustrated in Table 7.

Table 7: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	23.222	1	23.222	45.761	.000 ^b
	Residual	28.418	56	.507		
	Total	51.639	57			

a. Dependent Variable: Service delivery

b. Predictors: (Constant), Transparency

Source: Researcher, 2024

The conventional rule of determining whether the regression model is significant of considering the p-value (level of significance) of less or equal to 0.05 was applied. In this particular study, the calculated p-value was 0.000 that was well below 0.05 hence proving that the regression model was statistically significant ($F= 45.761$; $df = 1$; $p<0.05$; (0.000)). This implied that transparency significantly improves service delivery.

Further study findings from correlation analysis established a moderate positive statistically significant relationship between transparency and service delivery at MoFA. Conclusively, the tested hypothesis that was stated that transparency has an influence on service delivery was accepted.

The conclusions derived from this study are that the regularity of the general staff meetings at MoFA; the laxity in the general standards and diplomatic behaviours of at MoFA, as well as other internal management factors undermine transparency and eventual service delivery.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper proposes the following recommendations as necessary to improve service delivery at MoFA.

First, in order for MoFA to enhance service delivery at its offices and at missions abroad, efforts should be made to enhance public accountability at the ministry. This study specifically recommends the introduction of staff performance management measures that will encourage service delivery while at the same time reprimand poor staff performance. This study also recommends that introduction of a MoFA information management system to address gaps in information and communication with the MoFA and missions abroad. Lastly, the study recommends that deployment of staff at MoFA and at missions abroad should be harmonised and made more transparent to reflect the objectives of PSG and enhanced service delivery.

Second, on the concerns about transparency, the e study therefore recommends that MoFA should improve on the regularity of staff general meetings at both headquarters and at missions abroad for briefings for all staff members on policy and management issues. Similarly, the study also recommends that MoFA management should establish a code of conduct for foreign- service officers as a means of harmonising staff performance and enhancing service delivery.

Lastly, this study recommends that management staff of MoFA should put in place staff performance management measures that grant rewards for hard working staff as well and sanctions should be administered on staff whenever transparency is violated.

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